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PRESUMED IMMINENCE: JUDICIAL RISK ASSESSMENT IN 
THE POST-9/11 WORLD 
Avidan Y. Cover† 
Court opinions in the terrorism context are often distinguished by fact-
finding that relates to risk assessment. These risk assessments—inherently 
policy decisions—are influenced by cultural cognition and by cognitive 
errors common to probability determinations, particularly those made 
regarding highly dangerous and emotional events. In a post-9/11 world, in 
which prevention and intelligence are prioritized over prosecution, courts 
are more likely to overstate the potential harm, neglect the probability, and 
presume the imminence of terrorist attacks. As a result, courts are apt to 
defer to the government and require less evidence in support of measures 
that curtail civil liberties. This Article explores the body of behavioral 
applied science on biases and cognitive errors and examines post-9/11 case 
law through that discipline’s lens. The Article offers solutions for how courts 
should reach decisions that are less susceptible to psychological and cultural 
biases. In particular, courts should require the government to provide 
specific evidence supporting restrictions on civil liberties rather than accept 
speculative justifications. In addition, courts should disclose their anxiety 
and uncertainty over their own risk assessments, rather than cloaking them 
in empirical facts, the objectivity of which is always contested. 
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[I]t must remain open [for judicial determination] whether there 
actually did exist at the time a clear danger, whether the danger, if 
any, was imminent, and whether the evil apprehended was one so 
substantial as to justify the stringent restriction interposed by the 
Legislature. 
Whitney v. California1 
 
In this context, conclusions must often be based on informed judgment 
rather than concrete evidence, and that reality affects what we may 
reasonably insist on from the Government. 
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project2 
 
 
 1 274 U.S. 357, 379 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled on other grounds by 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). 
 2 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2728 (2010). 
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When we are dealing with detainees, candor obliges me to admit that 
one can not help but be conscious of the infinitely greater downside 
risk to our country, and its people, of an order releasing a detainee who 
is likely to return to terrorism. 
Esmail v. Obama3 
 
This time we are trying to name the future, not in our normally 
hopeful way but guided by dread. 
Don DeLillo4 
INTRODUCTION 
It is difficult—if not impossible—to determine the risk of a terrorist 
attack.5 The government always runs the chance of underestimating or 
overestimating the probability of an attack, both of which have costs. 
The 9/11 attacks themselves were attributed to a failure to appreciate the 
risk. In its report on the September 11th attacks, the 9/11 Commission 
criticized the government for its failure to imagine the likelihood of an 
attack by Al Qaeda.6 Yet based upon this failure of imagination, the 
pendulum has swung in the other direction. 
The threat of terrorism now summons a post-9/11 impression that 
although terrible harm may be uncertain, we must act as though it is 
imminent. Such thinking is a variant of the Precautionary Principle, 
which Cass Sunstein describes as the idea that “action should be taken to 
correct a problem as soon as there is evidence that harm may occur, not 
after the harm has already occurred.”7 But the post-9/11 presumption of 
imminence differs from the Precautionary Principle in that it addresses 
matters that generally defy quantifiable risk assessment.8 Action, as the 
 
 3 639 F.3d 1075, 1077–78 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Silberman, J., concurring). 
 4 Don DeLillo, In the Ruins of the Future: Reflections on Terror and Loss in the Shadow of 
September, HARPER’S MAG., Dec. 2001, at 39. 
 5 Risk assessment may be reduced most crudely to the following equation: Risk = (Harm 
Caused by Attack) x (Probability of Attack). See JOHN MUELLER & MARK G. STEWART, TERROR, 
SECURITY, AND MONEY: BALANCING THE RISKS, BENEFITS, AND COSTS OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
24 (2011). 
 6 NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 
339 (2004), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf. The 9/11 
Commission recommended taking steps that would “institutionalize imagination,” as well as 
structure better intelligence management, intelligence sharing between agencies, and a 
“preventive counterterrorism posture.” Id. at 346, 399–419, 425. 
 7 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 19 (2005) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 8 I am indebted to Juscelino Colares for his emphasizing the distinction between risk and 
uncertainty to me. In addressing threats that are uncertain—and therefore do not permit 
statistical evaluation—courts are even more likely to succumb to their own intuitions and 
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thinking goes, may be taken to address a perceived terrorism-related 
problem on the slightest reed of evidence. 
This mindset explains, for example, the capacious definition of 
imminence that the government purportedly relies on as part of its legal 
justification of targeted killings of American citizens.9 Due to the 
uncertainty of the harm and the likelihood of the risk of a terrorist 
attack, policymakers reduce evidentiary requirements and expand 
definitions of imminence in order to justify counterterrorism 
measures.10 No one wants to be wrong again.11 This post-9/11 heuristic12 
now pervades our society, our government, and our courts. 
Part of this transformation entails an emphasis on, and preference 
for, an intelligence-based preventative strategy. The preventative 
approach, which necessarily incorporates fear and uncertainty, is a 
hallmark of what legal scholars Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson have 
called the National Surveillance State.13 This governing regime “is 
increasingly statistically oriented, ex ante and preventative, rather than 
focused on deterrence and ex post prosecution of individual 
wrongdoing.”14 In this system, advances in technology and globalization 
may erode distinctions between international and domestic spheres.15 
The blurring of military, intelligence, and criminal lines also wreaks 
havoc with previously understood standards of proof, suspicion, and 
 
biases. Of course, even when statistical evaluation might be available, courts’ findings may be 
influenced by the same cognitive errors. 
 9 See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL OPERATION DIRECTED AGAINST A U.S. 
CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL LEADER OF AL-QA’IDA OR AN ASSOCIATED FORCE 7 
[hereinafter DEP’T OF JUSTICE WHITE PAPER], available at http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/
msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf (“[T]he condition that an operational 
leader present an ‘imminent’ threat of violent attack against the United States does not require 
the United States to have clear evidence that a specific attack on U.S. persons will take place in 
the immediate future. . . . [T]he threat posed by al-Qa’ida and its associated forces demands a 
broader concept of imminence in judging when a person continually planning terror attacks 
presents an imminent threat, making the use of force appropriate.”). 
 10 Id. 
 11 See HARVEY MOLOTCH, AGAINST SECURITY: HOW WE GO WRONG AT AIRPORTS, 
SUBWAYS, AND OTHER SITES OF AMBIGUOUS DANGER 8 (2012) (describing security planners’ 
sentiment that they must act regardless of whether they understand risk). 
 12 In this Article, I explore the notion of a post-9/11 world as a heuristic, which affects the 
way courts and others perceive risks, much in the same manner as Mary Dudziak discusses 
wartime as a heuristic. See MARY L. DUDZIAK, WAR TIME: AN IDEA, ITS HISTORY, ITS 
CONSEQUENCES (2012). Dudziak explains that the “wartime” heuristic is “a shorthand, invoking 
the traditional notion that the times are both exceptional and temporary.” Id. at 107. She argues 
that “wartime” is a form of cultural framing that may be used to justify government expansion, 
“rather than an inevitable feature of our world.” Id. at 136. 
 13 Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1, 
15 (2008); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change: From 
Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489 (2006). 
 14 Balkin, supra note 13, at 11. 
 15 See id. at 19–20 (noting that the government can justify domestic surveillance on the 
basis of foreign intelligence collection). 
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evidence.16 The preventative emphasis sets the foundation for “a parallel 
track of preventative law enforcement”—Guantanamo, extraordinary 
renditions, torture—that evades constitutional rights protections.17 
Moreover, the parallel track can creep into established criminal law 
enforcement and distort the traditional protections afforded in that 
realm.18 
The Supreme Court has directly addressed several of the 
government’s post-9/11 counterterrorism measures. While a number of 
the Court’s post-9/11 decisions—the enemy combatant decisions in 
particular—were often characterized by the media and some scholars as 
significant defeats for the government, there is reason to question that 
narrative. A few years removed, the decisions appear fairly modest in 
their limitations on the government.19 
Richard Fallon points out that the Court has not acted in a 
significant number of areas, including military movements in 
counterterrorism operations, state secrets, and detainee abuse, nor has it 
ordered the release of a detainee.20 Fallon attributes this restraint to the 
notion that judicial review is “politically constructed,” that is, Justices 
may decide cases based in part on how their opinions may be popularly 
received, and the Court’s authority respected.21 
This Article offers another explanation for the Court’s deference: 
The Justices are afraid. They are afraid of terrorism. They are afraid of 
 
 16 See id. at 15–16 (describing inevitable pressures to use military and intelligence resources 
in domestic law enforcement); see also Nick Paumgarten, The World of Surveillance: Here’s 
Looking at You, NEW YORKER, May 14, 2012, at 46 (describing evolution of military drone use 
to domestic law enforcement). 
 17 Balkin, supra note 13, at 15; see also DANA PRIEST & WILLIAM ARKIN, TOP SECRET 
AMERICA: THE RISE OF THE NEW AMERICAN SECURITY STATE 52 (2011) (describing government 
as two parallel governments: one open and the other a secret national security government). 
 18 Balkin, supra note 13, at 16. 
 19 Although the opinions assuredly mark a territorial role for the courts in the post-9/11 
world, they offer more heat than light. Stephen Vladeck has observed that the opinions derive 
from separation of powers structural principles, rather than from the Bill of Rights. Stephen I. 
Vladeck, The Passive-Aggressive Virtues, 111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 122, 127–30 (2011). 
Jenny Martinez has similarly observed that the decisions are more procedural than substantive, 
offering little insight on the nature of detainees’ rights. Jenny S. Martinez, Process and 
Substance in the “War on Terror,” 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1013, 1014–15 (2008). The decisions also 
provide minimal guidance even as to process, relegating many of the decisions on the details to 
lower courts and to the political branches. See Kim Lane Scheppele, The New Judicial Deference, 
92 B.U. L. REV. 89, 163–66 (2012); Vladeck, supra, at 130. 
 20 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, Habeas Corpus, and the War on Terror: An 
Essay on Law and Political Science, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 352, 367 (2010) (characterizing the 
Court’s opinions as addressing “the margins of the United States’s War on Terror policy”). The 
Court’s avoidance of counterterrorism issues is also reflected in the Court’s 5-4 decision 
holding lawyers and human rights advocates lacked standing to challenge § 702 of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (Supp. II 2008), finding their injury speculative 
and self-created. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). 
 21 Fallon, supra note 20, at 363–70; see also Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact 
Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1411, 1422, 1428 (2009) (noting “accountability and legitimacy 
concerns” in some factual judgments and the potential institutional fallout for the Court). 
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what could happen to our security if they rein in government. This 
Article examines the ways in which fear has affected and influenced 
judges in addressing terrorism. Importantly, the discussion is not 
limited to enemy combatant cases or to the Supreme Court, but 
examines the ways in which the post-9/11 heuristic has affected a range 
of judicial opinions, from limits on political protests, to airport security 
measures, to criminal prohibitions of material support of terrorism. 
Even when invoking judicial deference and lack of national security 
expertise, what can be seen at work in many judges’ post-9/11 opinions 
are their own risk assessments, which evidence their own cognitive 
biases impacted by the fears engendered by terrorism. Ironically, their 
frequent fact-finding of risks or lack of threat is wholly at odds with the 
purported deferential stance that judges insist they are taking in 
addressing the terrorism cases. This tendency can be seen in various 
Justices’ and lower court judges’ opinions, regardless of whether they 
uphold or strike down government actions. 
Part I of this Article explores the literature on decision making and 
risk assessment, and how certain “dread risks” can influence people’s 
decisions, particularly those of judges. Part I builds on Sunstein’s focus 
on cognitive errors in his Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary 
Principle, and looks at other scholars’ critiques of that account by also 
reviewing social and cultural influences that affect a person or a judge’s 
perception of risk. Part II then examines various court opinions to 
explore how these errors and influences manifest. Part III examines a 
number of ways in which courts articulate and rationalize their intuitive 
aversion to risk—their fears—through legal reasoning. Judges transform 
biases, such as probability neglect, into parts of their deliberative 
judgments—expressed as hypothetical scenarios, reduced standards of 
evidence, and legal analyses, such as the special needs doctrine. Next, 
Part IV addresses—and ultimately rejects—judicial deference as a means 
of adapting to the concomitant errors of judicial review of terrorism-
related matters. Finally, Part V proposes solutions that will enable 
judges to better overcome cognitive biases and other social and cultural 
influences. The Article concludes that evidentiary standards favoring 
those whose civil liberties are targeted is a necessary step toward 
overcoming particular judicial biases that ignore probability. In 
addition, judges should resist writing in terms of certainty, but should 
instead candidly disclose their uncertainty and anxiety over terrorism 
threats. 
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I.     ERRORS IN RISK ASSESSMENTS 
The past few decades have witnessed an upsurge of research on 
biases in judgments, decisions, and choices.22 Scholars cutting across the 
fields of economics and psychology, referred to collectively as applied 
behavioral science,23 have found that our intuitive thinking, or “System 
1,” is far more influential in reaching decisions than is commonly 
thought.24 Our deliberative faculties, “System 2,” while able to moderate 
our more instinctive judgments, are often still influenced by these first 
impressions.25 As a result of particular biases and cognitive errors, we 
are less adept at forecasting events than we tend to believe. Our ability to 
predict uncertain catastrophic events, such as a terrorist attack, is 
particularly burdened by these biases, which are accentuated when 
extremely vivid or emotional issues are involved. 
This Part first discusses the operations of System 1 and System 2 in 
our thinking. I then recount some of the biases that Cass Sunstein and 
others have catalogued that are most likely to affect judges’ decisions 
regarding terrorism. This Part then explores how peoples’ perceptions 
are also shaped by their cultural and social affiliations and identity. 
Finally, this Part examines the growing body of literature that 
documents how policy makers and judges are not immune from the 
influence of cognitive errors and other influences.26 
A.     System 1 and System 2 
Psychologists divide our ways of thinking into two primary 
methods: System 1 and System 2.27 System 1 describes our “automatic” 
 
 22 See, e.g., JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman, 
Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982); DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 
(2011); PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK (2000); THE BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
PUBLIC POLICY (Eldar Shafir ed., 2013); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under 
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124 (1974). 
 23 “Applied behavioral science” refers to the work by those often termed behavioral 
economists and social psychologists regarding the emotional, cognitive, social, and cultural 
factors that influence behaviors. See Daniel Kahneman, Foreword to THE BEHAVIORAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 22, at ix. 
 24 KAHNEMAN, supra note 22, at 21–22. 
 25 Id. at 103–04, 415. 
 26 This Article considers judges as policy makers. Their decisions help shape policies; the 
decisions themselves are not simply statements of fact or law, but invariably reflect views on 
policies. See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1954–55 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(describing role of judges’ policy preferences in making decisions); Paul Brest, Quis Custodiet 
Ipsos Custodes?: Debiasing the Policy Makers Themselves, in THE BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 22, at 482 (“Policy makers include legislators, administrative 
officials who determine facts or make decisions, and judges (notwithstanding the unconvincing 
claims of federal judicial nominees that they do not make policy).”). 
 27 KAHNEMAN, supra note 22, at 20–21. 
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mode of thinking, which is based on “impressions, intuitions, 
intentions, and feelings.”28 System 2, on the other hand, describes a 
more complex manner of thinking; one that entails greater 
concentration and conscious reasoning.29 
Some aspects of System 1 are innate or reflexive, such as the 
recognition of an object or the fear of an animal.30 Other System 1 
functions may be learned, such as simple mathematical equations like 
“2 + 2 = 4” or basic facts such as “thinking of Paris when the capital of 
France is mentioned.”31 This automatic and impulsive sort of thinking is 
critical to getting through many activities without too much exertion.32 
But System 1 thinking is also distinguished by irrational responses to 
stimuli, confirmation bias, heuristics, and probability neglect.33 
System 2 thinking comes into play when activities demand greater 
attention, such as a more involved mathematical equation like “17 x 24,” 
or evaluating a complex logical argument.34 In some instances, System 2 
controls the impulses of System 1, or acts as a filter of System 1, 
preventing potentially inaccurate or foolish decisions.35 But System 2 
also inevitably builds on the impressions of System 1, turning them into 
beliefs and judgments.36 However, people often try to hide, or do not 
believe, or are unaware, that their reasoned decisions are the product of 
impulsive reactions.37 Thus, System 2 may sometimes act as “an 
apologist for System 1,” leading to decisions predicated on biases and 
other cognitive errors.38 The next few sections examine these cognitive 
errors in greater detail. 
B.     Availability and Affect Heuristics 
In analyzing risks, people often resort to what is available to them 
in trying to understand or make their assessment.39 This mode of 
thinking is referred to as the “availability heuristic.”40 Specifically, 
 
 28 Id. at 24. 
 29 Id. at 21–22. 
 30 Id. Daniel Kahneman provides a helpful list of examples of automatic System 1 activities, 
which include detecting hostility in a voice and reading words on billboards. Id. at 21, 105 
(listing characteristics of System 1). 
 31 Id. at 22. 
 32 See id. at 416 (“System 1 is indeed the origin of much that we do wrong, but it is also the 
origin of most of what we do right—which is most of what we do.”). 
 33 See id. at 105. 
 34 Id. at 22–23 (listing examples of System 2 operations). 
 35 Id. at 24–25, 415. 
 36 Id.  
 37 Id. at 21, 415–17. 
 38 Id. at 415. 
 39 Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 22, at 1127.  
 40 KAHNEMAN, supra note 22, at 129–35; SUNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 36. 
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people try to determine the magnitude of a risk based on what they can 
most easily think of. Thus, people are more likely to be frightened by 
something if they can think of examples of its occurring than if they 
cannot. So, for example, a bump in media reports of shark attacks will 
lead many people to believe attacks are more likely than is statistically 
probable.41 
People also make decisions about an activity’s risks based on their 
positive or negative feelings about an activity.42 This sort of reasoning is 
called the affect heuristic.43 Thus, a person who has a negative reaction 
about a particular course of conduct is likely to ascribe other negative 
qualities to the action and ignore possible positive attributes. For 
example, a person with a negative view of guns is more likely to cite 
statistics on gun-related accidents in the home, but ignore instances in 
which having a gun protected a person from a home intruder.44 
While familiarity will influence what is available to people in how 
they assess risk, Sunstein notes, so too will the salience of an event.45 
Thus, watching video footage of a boat capsizing will have a greater 
impact on the probability assessment of such events than if one reads 
about the accident.46 Similarly, the more vivid or detailed the 
description of the possible harm, the more likely people are to believe it 
will come to fruition.47 
It is hard to exaggerate the salience of the 9/11 attacks. Devastating 
in the thousands of lives killed, watched in real time by millions, the 
attacks left an impression that is deeply etched in people’s 
 
 41 See, e.g., Brest, supra note 26, at 486 (observing that there are many more deaths caused 
by falling television sets than by shark attacks); see also DANIEL GARDNER, THE SCIENCE OF 
FEAR: HOW THE CULTURE OF FEAR MANIPULATES YOUR BRAIN 179–80 (2009) (describing the 
“Summer of the Shark” in 2001). 
 42 Ian Bateman, Sam Dent, Ellen Peters, Paul Slovic & Chris Starmer, The Affect Heuristic 
and the Attractiveness of Simple Gambles, in PAUL SLOVIC, THE FEELING OF RISK: NEW 
PERSPECTIVES ON RISK PERCEPTION 3, 4 (2010). 
 43 Id.; see also KAHNEMAN, supra note 22, at 103, 138–40. 
 44 See, e.g., KAHNEMAN, supra note 22, at 103 (describing how “political preferences” and 
“emotional attitude” influence views on benefits and risks). 
 45 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 37. 
 46 See id. 
 47 Id. Sunstein discusses a study that illustrates this point. Id. at 38 (citing Stephen J. 
Sherman et al., Imagining Can Heighten or Lower the Perceived Likelihood of Contracting a 
Disease: The Mediating Effect of Ease of Imagery, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY 
OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 82 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002)). 
Researchers had subjects read a description of an illness that was spreading across a campus. Id. 
One group received a description of the symptoms that was easy to understand and imagine 
while another group received a description of the symptoms that was vague and difficult to 
imagine. Id. The subjects were asked to write an account of what it would feel like if they had 
the illness. Id. The participants were then told to assess on a one to ten point scale the 
probability of getting the illness. Id. Those receiving the more comprehensible symptoms were 
far more likely to believe they would contract the illness. Id. at 38–39. 
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consciousness.48 News coverage for weeks and months afterward was 
constant. Further reflecting the pervasive and available idea of a risk of a 
terrorist attack, the United States government and the media continually 
reported to the public that there was an elevated, or higher, risk of a 
terrorist attack.49 For example, the color-coded Homeland Security 
Advisory system, which was implemented in 2002, never lowered its 
color-coded threat level below that of yellow or “an elevated significant 
risk of terrorist attacks” from the time of the program’s inception until it 
was replaced in 2011.50 Critics of the color-coded threat levels often 
complained that the system only stoked anxiety without providing 
substantive information.51 
As novelist Don DeLillo puts it: 
It is our lives and minds that are occupied now. This catastrophic 
event changes the way we think and act, moment to moment, week 
to week, for unknown weeks and months to come, and steely years. 
Our world, parts of our world, have crumbled into theirs, which 
means we are living in a place of danger and rage.52  
The almost permanently etched and horrific imagery of the attacks is as 
fertile ground as there is for the availability and affect heuristics.53 
 
 48 A study conducted by “[t]elevision researcher Nielsen and Sony Electronics” found that 
“[w]atching news coverage of the September 11 attacks” was “the most impactful TV moment[] 
of the past 50 years.” Courtney Garcia, September 11 Attacks, Katrina Top List of Memorable 
TV Moments, REUTERS (July 11, 2012, 2:53 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/11/
entertainment-us-memorablemoments-idUSBRE86A0EG20120711. 
 49 Brigitte L. Nacos, Yaeli Bloch-Elkon & Robert Y. Shapiro, Post-9/11 Terrorism Threats, 
News Coverage, and Public Perceptions in the United States, 1 INT’L J. CONFLICT & VIOLENCE 
105, 111–14 (2007). 
 50 David Kravets, Color-Coded Threat Level Advisory Under Attack, WIRED.COM (Sept. 16, 
2009, 3:17 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/09/threatleveladvisory; see also Pierre 
Thomas & Jason Ryan, DHS to Scrap Color Code Terror Alerts by April, ABC NEWS (Jan. 26, 
2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/dept-homeland-security-decides-retire-color-code-
threat/story?id=12770409. The replacement for the color-coded system is known as the 
National Terrorism Advisory System. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NTAS GUIDE: NATIONAL 
TERRORISM ADVISORY SYSTEM PUBLIC GUIDE 2 (Apr. 2011), available at http://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/ntas/ntas-public-guide.pdf. The new system will purportedly issue alerts only 
“when credible information is available.” Id. The alerts will state whether there is “an imminent 
threat or elevated threat,” and “will provide a concise summary of the potential threat, 
information about actions being taken to ensure public safety, and recommended steps that 
individuals, communities, businesses and governments can take to help prevent, mitigate or 
respond to the threat.” Id. An “elevated threat” alert is issued when the Department of 
Homeland Security does not have “specific information about the timing or location” of the 
threat. Id. at 4. The alert is “[i]mminent, if [DHS] believe[s] the threat is impending or very 
soon.” Id. 
 51 Thomas & Ryan, supra note 50; see also Kravets, supra note 50. To be sure, the program 
also lost the public’s confidence and people grew largely indifferent to the alert system as well. 
See id. 
 52 DeLillo, supra note 4, at 33. 
 53 President Bush utilized the availability heuristic in asking rhetorically why it was 
necessary to attack Iraq, and answering simply: “There is a reason. We have experienced the 
horror of September 11. . . . Our enemies would be no less willing—in fact they would be 
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C.     Probability Neglect 
Probability neglect refers to peoples’ tendency to disregard the 
likelihood of an event, particularly when the feared event evokes 
powerful feelings.54 Again, as with the availability heuristic, events that 
can be readily associated with images that elicit strong emotional 
reactions such as fear, will skew peoples’ ability to assess the likelihood 
of risk, leading them to ignore differences in probability. Also when 
people harbor negative feelings toward something they are less inclined 
to entertain questions of probability.55 
Consider the following study’s findings: “[W]hen people are asked 
how much they will pay for flight insurance for losses resulting from 
‘terrorism,’ they will pay more than if they are asked how much they will 
pay for flight insurance from all causes.”56 The specter of terrorism and 
the emotional wallop it entails leads people to make significant 
judgments in error regarding the likelihood of certain harms.57 
Moreover, a psychological study further determined that just the 
discussion of a low-probability risk, even one in which trustworthy 
sources elaborate on the minimal risk, increases perceptions of the risk’s 
probability.58 
What are termed “dread risks,” “worst-case scenarios,” or “low-
probability, high-consequence events,” powerfully impact human 
behavior.59 Consider that in the three months after the 9/11 attacks 
occurred, numerous Americans stopped flying and a good proportion of 
those people chose to drive instead.60 Flying remains, even with the 
 
eager—to use a biological, or chemical, or a nuclear weapon.” Bush: Don’t Wait for Mushroom 
Cloud, CNN.COM/INSIDE POL. (Oct. 8, 2002, 10:47 AM), http://edition.cnn.com/2002/
ALLPOLITICS/10/07/bush.transcript. The merging of the Iraq War and 9/11 in the public 
consciousness was pronounced. Polling found that in April 2004, 20% of Americans believed 
Iraq was responsible for the 9/11 attacks. Amy Gershkoff & Shana Kushner, Shaping Public 
Opinion: The 9/11-Iraq Connection in the Bush Administration’s Rhetoric, 3 PERSP. ON POL. 525, 
533 (2005). A late 2002 poll also found that people who considered Al Qaeda the most 
important threat to the United States were more likely to support invading Iraq than those who 
ranked Al Qaeda as less of a threat. Id. at 531. 
 54 SUNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 39, 64–67. As Sunstein notes, probability neglect may skew 
people’s judgments whether the outcome is one feared or hoped for. Id. at 39. For example, a 
person ignores the small likelihood of winning when he buys a lottery ticket. See id. 
 55 Id. at 39, 86 (discussing “affect heuristic”); see also KAHNEMAN, supra note 22, at 103, 
139–40. 
 56 SUNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 40 (citing Eric J. Johnson et al., Framing, Probability 
Distortions, and Insurance Decisions, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 35 (1993)). 
 57 See id.  
 58 Id. (citing A.S. Alkahami & Paul Slovic, A Psychological Study of the Inverse Relationship 
Between Perceived Risk and Perceived Benefit, 14 RISK ANALYSIS 1085, 1086, 1094 (1994)). 
 59 SUNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 65; Gerd Gigerenzer, Dread Risk, September 11, and Fatal 
Traffic Accidents, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 286, 286–87 (2004). 
 60 Gigerenzer, supra note 59, at 286–87. 
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specter of terrorism, a far less risky endeavor than driving.61 Yet, people 
disregarded this fact. The increase in road traffic led to 353 more 
fatalities nationwide “in the last [three] months of 2001” when 
compared to the last quarter of the preceding five years, 1996–2000.62 
Also at work here may be an alarmist bias. When differing 
accounts of risk are presented, people are more likely to favor the more 
“alarming” version, crediting the accounts that describe more dangers as 
more informative. W. Kip Viscusi characterizes this outcome as one of 
“‘irrational asymmetry: respondents overweigh[] the value of a high risk 
judgement.’”63 
In fact, there may even be reason to believe that the fear 
engendered by the 9/11 attacks has contagion effects, leading people to 
fear increased risks from sources well beyond terrorism. For example, a 
study of ninth graders in California found that adolescents surveyed 
prior to 9/11 perceived a lesser risk of dying than those surveyed a few 
weeks after the attacks.64 Specifically, respondents believed there was a 
34.62% chance of dying by a tornado before 9/11, but the perception of 
such a risk increased to 64.33% after the attacks.65 The perceived risk of 
dying by earthquake increased from 24.64% to 41.94%.66 
When seized by fear, people make probability determinations that 
they would otherwise not make. Moreover, these decisions do not track 
the variations in probability. One study asked participants what they 
would pay to avoid participating in an experiment in which there was a 
chance they would be subjected to a painful electric shock or to a $20 
penalty.67 Faced with a 1%, 99%, or 100% risk of shock, participants’ 
median willingness to pay ranged from $7 to avoid the 1% risk to $10 to 
avoid the 99% risk.68 In contrast, the willingness to pay to avoid the $20 
penalty ranged from $1 to avoid the 1% chance to $18 to avoid the 99% 
chance.69 The results demonstrate that people are willing to pay a lot to 
avoid the low probability of an “affect-rich outcome,” but that their 
 
 61 See GARDNER, supra note 41, at 3 (comparing a “1-in-135,000 chance of being killed in 
a[n airplane] hijacking” to a “1-in-6,000 [chance] of being killed in a car crash”). 
 62 Gigerenzer, supra note 59, at 286–87.  
 63 SUNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 82 (quoting W. Kip Viscusi, Alarmist Decisions with Divergent 
Risk Information, 107 ECON. J. 1657, 1668 (1997)). 
 64 Bonnie L. Halpern-Felsher & Susan G. Millstein, The Effects of Terrorism on Teens’ 
Perceptions of Dying: The New World Is Riskier than Ever, 30 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 308, 310 
(2002). 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 SUNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 76–77 (discussing Yuval Rottenstreich & Christopher K. Hsee, 
Money, Kisses, and Electric Shocks: On the Affective Psychology of Risk, 12 PSYCH. SCI. 185 
(2001)). 
 68 Rottenstreich & Hsee, supra note 67, at 188. 
 69 Id. 
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willingness to pay does not vary greatly with the probability of the 
occurrence of the event.70 
Similarly, even when the risks of a high outrage occurrence such as 
nuclear waste radiation, and a low outrage event, like radon exposure, 
were the same, people perceived the high outrage threat as a higher risk 
and expressed a greater intention to limit that threat.71 Another study 
found that people perceived a greater risk from a terrorist event causing 
the same number of casualties as a non-terrorist propane tank explosion 
or release of an infectious disease.72 
Based on the empirical literature, Sunstein concludes that experts 
are better placed than ordinary people to make risk assessment because 
the former are more rational and aware of the relevant facts.73 He 
stresses that it is “irrationality, not a different set of values,” that 
explains the gulf in risk assessments.74 
D.     Cultural Cognition 
Dan Kahan, Paul Slovic, and other scholars have argued that 
Sunstein’s emphasis on risk perception as irrational ignores peoples’ 
propensity to adopt views on risk consonant with their cultural 
worldview.75 They call this inclination “cultural cognition.”76 Disputing 
Sunstein’s contention that risk may be objectively evaluated, Kahan and 
his co-authors argue that people match their evaluations of risk to their 
conception of an “ideal society.”77 Given this conception of risk as 
subjective, they conclude risk is something that should be publicly 
deliberated, rather than limited to expert analysis and resolution.78 
One way in which people may process information is through 
“identity-protective cognition.” Identity-protective cognition is a type of 
 
 70 Id. at 188–89. 
 71 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 80 (discussing Peter M. Sandman et al., Communications 
to Reduce Risk Underestimation and Overestimation, 3 J. RISK DECISION & POL’Y 93 (1998)). 
When dealing with “outrage” risks, people react the same, even if the difference in risk is 
between 1-in-100,000 and 1-in-1,000,000. Id. 
 72 See William J. Burns & Paul Slovic, Predicting and Modeling Public Response to a 
Terrorist Strike, in SLOVIC, supra note 42, at 285, 293–97, 302. 
 73 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 85–87. 
 74 Id. at 86. 
 75 Dan M. Kahan, Paul Slovic, Donald Braman & John Gastil, Fear of Democracy: A 
Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1071 (2006) (book review).  
 76 Id. at 1072–73, 1083–88; Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court 2010 Term—Foreword: 
Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. 
L. REV. 1, 23 (2011). 
 77 Kahan, Slovic, Braman & Gastil, supra note 75, at 1072, 1105 (discussing MARY DOUGLAS 
& AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE 36 (1982)); see also KAHNEMAN, supra note 22, at 
140–45 (discussing implications for the role of experts in light of the debate over risk as either a 
product of culture or as reducible to objective criteria). 
 78 See Kahan, Slovic, Braman & Gastil, supra note 75, at 1105–06. 
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reasoning that impels people to think and decide in a manner that 
affirms their membership in a social group.79 This may take the form of 
a search for information that supports the positions of their group 
identity.80 People are also inclined to dismiss information that 
challenges the positions of their group.81 People are also generally 
unable to appreciate the effects of identity-protective cognition. 
Specifically, people tend to characterize their opponents’ views as 
biased, whereas they consider their own views predicated on objective 
fact.82 
Cultural cognition also helps explain the availability heuristic, the 
affect heuristic, and probability neglect.83 Cultural worldviews can 
explain what is available to people and what they view as negative or 
positive, thus shaping how their biases tilt and how they forecast the 
likelihood of particular events.84 
E.     Judicial Susceptibility to Errors 
Research and anecdotal accounts suggest that judges may also be 
susceptible to emotions and concomitant cognitive errors in their 
decision making.85 For example, one study found that on various 
cognitive tests, trial judges tend to employ intuitive, rather than 
deliberative, reasoning at levels very similar to the general public, 
resulting in poorer scores.86 Other studies evidence judges’ tendencies to 
respond intuitively to numeric anchors. In one study, German judges 
were given a description of a shoplifter and then rolled loaded dice that 
 
 79 Kahan, supra note 76, at 20; see also Cassandra Burke Robertson, Due Process in the 
American Identity, 64 ALA. L. REV. 255, 271–79 (2012) (discussing the roles of identity and 
social identity in the war on terror). 
 80 Kahan, supra note 76, at 21. 
 81 Id. Identity-protective cognition is not only exhibited by “emotional” or “affective” right 
brain thinkers. Id. People who are reflective and deliberate in their judgments, or are left brain 
thinkers, are likely to employ complex information analysis to support their group’s views. Id. 
These tendencies bear striking similarity to what we commonly refer to as “confirmation bias.” 
See KAHNEMAN, supra note 22, at 80–81. 
 82 Kahan, supra note 76, at 22. 
 83 Kahan, Slovic, Braman & Gastil, supra note 75, at 1084–85. 
 84 Id. 
 85 See, e.g., Brest, supra note 26, at 481 (describing biases affecting policy makers, 
particularly in the areas of adjudicative fact-finding, legislative fact-finding, and decision-
making); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How 
Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007). 
 86 Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 85, at 17; see also Brest, supra note 26, at 484–
85 (discussing biases common to the adjudicative process, including hindsight bias, anchoring 
and insufficient adjustment, confirmation bias, treating evidence originating from a single 
source as if it were based on multiple independent sources, and difficulties in prediction). 
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would land on either a three or a nine.87 Judges who rolled a nine said 
they would sentence the shoplifter to an average of eight months, 
whereas those who rolled a three recommended a five-month 
sentence.88 
Additional studies found judges likely to react emotionally to 
evaluations of statistical evidence and assess conduct after learning of 
outcomes associated with that conduct, which leads to erroneous or 
unjust results.89 Other studies have found that in areas where 
predictions are often inaccurate, judges may “over-rely on their 
intuitions.”90 Still another study found that extraneous influences, such 
as a late morning snack or lunch, could lead to more favorable rulings 
by judges.91 
Although these studies have generally focused on trial judges and 
have greater ramifications for those making relatively quick decisions, 
the demonstrable impact of intuition on judgments suggests that initial 
responses to emotional stimuli will impact appellate decisions as well. 
For example, appellate judges may rely on System 1 thinking and 
intuition in choosing how to vote immediately after argument. 
Thereafter, writing the opinion is a System 2 exercise in justifying a 
particular outcome, notwithstanding the possibility of the judge’s 
change of heart or mind.92 
Paul Brest argues that appellate courts’ legislative fact-finding—
determining facts that support particular regulations or acts—is equally 
susceptible to availability and affect biases.93 He suggests that judges’ 
lack of training in statistics renders them more prone to errors in 
probability determinations.94 Brest also contends that “[i]n legislative 
fact-finding, overconfidence combines with motivated skepticism, 
confirmation bias, and the gravitational force of prior commitments to 
make it particularly difficult for policy makers to be open to considering 
alternative positions relevant to major policy issues.”95 
 
 87 KAHNEMAN, supra note 22, at 125–26 (discussing Birte Englich, Thomas Mussweiler & 
Fritz Strack, Playing Dice with Criminal Sentences: The Influence of Irrelevant Anchors on 
Experts’ Judicial Decision Making, 32 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 188, 188–200 
(2006)). 
 88 Id. 
 89 Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 85, at 19, 43; see also Terry A. Maroney, 
Emotional Regulation and Judicial Behavior, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1485, 1494–1501 (2011) 
(reviewing literature on the impact of emotion on judicial decision making). 
 90 Brest, supra note 26, at 485 (citing Robyn M. Dawes, David Faust & Paul E. Meehl, 
Clinical Versus Actuarial Judgment, 243 SCI. 1668 (1989)). 
 91 Shai Danziger, Jonathan Levav & Liora Avnaim-Pesso, Extraneous Factors in Judicial 
Decisions, 108 PNAS 6889 (2011). 
 92 See RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 128 (2013) (characterizing the judge’s 
confidence in his decision as a “common self-delusion”). 
 93 Brest, supra note 26, at 486. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 487. Although there have been no empirical studies examining the impact of 
COVER.35.4 (Do Not Delete) 4/10/2014  2:24 PM 
1430 C ARD O Z O  L A W R E V IE W  [Vol. 35:1415 
 
Many judges may cling to the principle or belief that their decisions 
withstand the influence of System 1 thinking or other external 
considerations, but individual accounts by appellate judges indicate that 
emotions inevitably affect and influence their reasoning.96 Judge 
Richard Posner contends that it is impossible “to judge without 
biases.”97 Posner argues these biases or “priors” influence all judges, 
including at the appellate level, in their weightings of evidence and 
assessments of probability.98 Judge Alex Kozinski also acknowledges the 
presence and potential influence of emotions and biases, but suggests 
that a judge can overcome them through thoughtful deliberation.99 
Posner proposes that “[t]hrough self-awareness and discipline a judge 
can learn not to allow his sympathies or antipathies to influence his 
judicial votes—unduly.”100 Other judges, as discussed below, 
acknowledge the emotional impact of the 9/11 attacks on their 
decisions; whether they are able to overcome the related cognitive biases 
is less clear. 
II.     POST-9/11 JUDICIAL RISK ASSESSMENTS 
Many judicial opinions invoke the “post-9/11 world” in upholding 
measures taken in connection with airport security,101 subway 
 
cultural cognition and identity-protective cognition on judges, Kahan speculates that such 
studies would demonstrate that judges are better able than laypersons, due to certain “habits of 
mind,” to overcome, “but not perfectly,” the prejudicial effects of identity-protective cognition. 
Kahan, supra note 75, at 24, 27–28. 
 96 POSNER, supra note 92, at 129–30 (“Many judges would say that nothing outside ‘the law,’ 
in the narrow sense that confines the word to the texts of formal legal documents, influences 
their judicial votes at all. Some of them are speaking for public consumption, and know better. 
Those who are speaking sincerely are fooling themselves.”); see also Maroney, supra note 89, at 
1497–98; Linda Greenhouse, Op-Ed., When Judges Don’t Know Everything, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/31/opinion/greenhouse-when-judges-dont-know-
everything.html. 
 97 POSNER, supra note 92, at 129. While insisting that judges are invariably influenced by 
emotions, Posner also argues that feelings elicited by the facts of a case can be a good basis for a 
decision. See id.; RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 106 (2008). 
 98 POSNER, supra note 92, at 130. 
 99 Alex Kozinski, What I Ate for Breakfast and Other Mysteries of Judicial Decision Making, 
26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 993, 997–98 (1993); see also Maroney, supra note 89, at 1508–31 
(discussing approaches to integrating emotions in judicial decision making). But see Cynthia 
McPherson Frantz, I AM Being Fair: The Bias Blind Spot as a Stumbling Block to Seeing Both 
Sides, 28 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 157, 161 (2006) (conducting experiments showing 
that greater deliberation actually firms up pre-existing unconscious biases); Cassandra Burke 
Robertson, Judgment, Identity, and Independence, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1, 11 (2009) (discussing 
McPherson Frantz’s studies). 
 100 POSNER, supra note 92, at 130. Posner notes that the qualification of “unduly” bears 
emphasis. See id. It is in the context of highly emotional and potentially consequential cases, 
such as those concerning terrorism, however, that System 1 and its concomitant biases are 
likely to exert “undue” influence on even appellate judges. 
 101 See United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 960 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc); State v. Rabb, 920 
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searches,102 restrictions on political speech at political conventions,103 
and immigration decisions.104 Some courts have been particularly 
candid about the influence of the post-9/11 heuristic and how it affects 
their perceptions of risks, facts, and law. Even without explicit reference 
we see biases and cultural cognition at work in many post-9/11 opinions 
that involve risk assessment. 
A.     Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project 
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project105 presents the Supreme 
Court’s fullest discussion of risk assessment and fact-finding concerning 
terrorism. In this pre-enforcement challenge to the material support 
statute, a 6-3 majority held that prohibiting teaching international 
humanitarian law for peaceful purposes to a foreign terrorist group did 
not, as applied to the plaintiff human rights advocates, violate the First 
Amendment.106 The dispute between the majority and the dissent 
centered on whether the teaching would aid terrorist groups; in effect, 
whether their speech would make a terrorist attack more likely. 
The material support statute at issue, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, makes it a 
federal crime to “knowingly provide[] material support or resources to a 
foreign terrorist organization.”107 The plaintiffs were human rights 
advocates who wanted to teach international humanitarian and human 
rights law to two designated foreign terrorist organizations, Partiya 
 
So. 2d 1175, 1189 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (“Without doubt any protection of luggage in such 
a public location has been eroded to nearly the point of non-existence in a post-9/11 world.”); 
Kjolhede v. State, 333 S.W.3d 631, 633–34 (Tex. App. 2009) (“Any subjective belief a person 
might have that his baggage checked for transport aboard a passenger aircraft may not be 
searched ‘makes little sense in a post–9/11 world.’” (quoting Aukai, 497 F.3d at 960)). 
 102 See MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 103 See Marcavage v. City of New York, 689 F.3d 98, 105 (2d Cir. 2012); Bl(a)ck Tea Soc’y v. 
City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 18–19 (1st Cir. 2004) (Lipez, J., concurring). 
 104 See Safadi v. Howard, 466 F. Supp. 2d 696, 701 (E.D. Va. 2006) (holding that the court 
lacked jurisdiction over government processing of adjustment to permanent residence status 
applications and that a four-year delay may be reasonable in light of security concerns “in this 
post-9/11 world”); see also Ma v. Rice, Nos. 8-CV-14008, 08-CV-14009, 2009 WL 160288, at *6 
(E.D. Mich. Jan. 22, 2009) (collecting cases finding that the U.S. Citizenship & Immigration 
Services (USCIS) has discretion as to timing of review of adjustment applications and that 
courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to compel USCIS to process an application). Lower 
courts have also come to the opposite conclusion, rejecting the invocation of the “post-9/11 
world” as “a magic talisman that can be waved in front of courts whenever the government 
seeks to insulate itself from judicial review.” Saleem v. Keisler, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1060 
(W.D. Wis. 2007); see also Kashkool v. Chertoff, 553 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1146–47 (D. Ariz. 2008) 
(collecting cases rejecting 9/11 attacks as sole basis for denial of review). 
 105 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010). 
 106 Id. at 2725–30. The Court also held that the material support statute was not vague under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, id. at 2718–21, and that it did not violate the 
plaintiffs’ freedom of association under the First Amendment. Id. at 2730–31. 
 107 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2012). 
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Karkeran Kurdistan (PKK) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE), which seek independent states for, respectively, Kurds in 
Turkey and Tamils in Sri Lanka.108 The human rights advocates sought 
clarity, through a pre-enforcement challenge, whether their teaching 
could fall within the proscribed terms of “training,” “expert advice or 
assistance,” “personnel,” or “services” within the statute.109 
In undertaking the First Amendment analysis, Chief Justice 
Roberts, in his majority opinion, did not apply strict scrutiny.110 He did 
not regard the speech as pure political speech, or as conduct, as the 
government argued, but as providing material support in the form of 
speech.111 Instead he applied “‘a more demanding standard’” than that 
required by the conduct standard in United States v. O’Brien.112 
Accepting combatting terrorism as a compelling interest, it 
remained to determine whether prohibiting the plaintiffs’ speech would 
further the government interest in preventing terrorism. Roberts framed 
the issue as an “empirical question”—“[w]hether foreign terrorist 
organizations meaningfully segregate support of their legitimate 
activities from support of terrorism.”113 Roberts explained that he was 
deferring to the political branch’s determinations because the case 
“implicates sensitive and weighty interests of national security and 
foreign affairs.”114 Quoting Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion from 
Boumediene v. Bush on the habeas rights of detainees at Guantanamo 
Bay, Roberts noted that “‘neither the Members of this Court nor most 
federal judges begin the day with briefings that may describe new and 
serious threats to our Nation and its people.’”115 
Roberts reasoned that deference to the government’s conclusions 
was also appropriate because terrorism presented a context involving 
 
 108 Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2713. 
 109 Id. at 2714. 
 110 The majority explained that the material support statute “may be described as directed at 
conduct . . . but as applied to plaintiffs the conduct triggering coverage under the statute 
consists of communicating a message.” Id. at 2724. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989)) (citing United States v. O’Brien, 
391 U.S. 367 (1968)). 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. at 2727. The Court distinguished the litigation from the question in Cohen v. 
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). Id. at 2728. In that case the State of California convicted a man 
for wearing a jacket bearing the word “Fuck the Draft.” Cohen, 403 U.S. at 16. Roberts 
explained that the Cohen Court had invalidated that conviction in part because the government 
could not make principled distinctions concerning the offensiveness of speech. Humanitarian 
Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2728 (quoting Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25). Here, in contrast, Roberts 
explained, the political branches were “uniquely positioned” to distinguished between what 
will, and will not, aid terrorism and harm foreign relations. Id. 
 115 Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2727 (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 
723, 797 (2008)); see also id. (“It is vital in this context ‘not to substitute . . . our own evaluation 
of evidence for a reasonable evaluation by the Legislative Branch.’” (alteration in original) 
(quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 68 (1981))). 
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“efforts to confront evolving threats in an area where information can 
be difficult to obtain and the impact of certain conduct difficult to 
assess.”116 Moreover, “the material-support statute is, on its face, a 
preventive measure” that does not criminalize terrorist attacks, but 
criminalizes the aid that increases the probability of the attacks.117 
Accordingly, the Court should not scrutinize the evidence too 
rigorously. “In this context,” Roberts explained,  
conclusions must often be based on informed judgment rather than 
concrete evidence, and that reality affects what we may reasonably 
insist on from the Government . . . . The Government, when seeking 
to prevent imminent harms in the context of international affairs and 
national security, is not required to conclusively link all the pieces in 
the puzzle before we grant weight to its empirical conclusions.118 
Roberts held that the government’s conclusions merited 
“significant weight” and were sustained by “persuasive evidence.”119 He 
concluded that the teaching intended to promote lawful and peaceful 
ends was “fungible” because it “free[d] up other resources within the 
organization that may be put to violent ends.”120 He also determined 
that the advocates’ teaching and communication about international law 
and the United Nations could legitimize, and therefore assist, terrorist 
acts.121 Such legitimacy could facilitate recruitment of members and the 
increase of funds in support of terrorist acts.122 
Although Roberts presented his opinion as one of judicial 
deference, he also conjured up his own idea of how lawful and peaceful 
advocacy might aid terrorism. “The PKK could,” Roberts offered as an 
example, “pursue peaceful negotiation as a means of buying time to 
recover from short-term setbacks, lulling opponents into complacency, 
and ultimately preparing for renewed attacks.”123 For support, Roberts 
cited the book, Blood and Belief, a few pages of which discussed the 
PKK’s suspension of violence and return to fighting.124 The government 
 
 116 Id. at 2727. 
 117 Id. at 2728. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. at 2725. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. Roberts also found that the teaching could support terrorism by straining relations 
with Turkey, which might not tolerate any form of support of the PKK. Id. at 2726–27. 
 123 Id. at 2729. The hypothesized outcome is one without historical precedent in the national 
security-free speech canon. In his dissent, Justice Breyer observed that the Court had never 
before “accepted anything like a claim that speech or teaching might be criminalized lest it, e.g., 
buy negotiating time for an opponent who would put that time to bad use.” Id. at 2738 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (citing Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Schenck v. United States, 249 
U.S. 47 (1919); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919)). 
 124 Id. at 2729 (majority opinion) (citing ALIZA MARCUS, BLOOD AND BELIEF: THE PKK AND 
THE KURDISH FIGHT FOR INDEPENDENCE 286–95 (2007)); see also id. at 2738 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (criticizing reliance on this book and emphasizing its limited relevance). 
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neither made this argument nor was the book a part of the record.125 But 
defending his hypothesized danger, Robert explained, “[t]his possibility 
is real, not remote.”126 
Dissenting, Justice Breyer insisted that notwithstanding the 
significant threat of terrorism, the Court could assess any evidence of 
the danger involved, the gravity of the threat, and its imminence.127 But 
Breyer disputed that there was any “evidence” or “specific facts” 
supporting the government’s and the majority’s conclusion that the 
advocates’ teaching was either fungible or would legitimize the PKK.128 
Roberts’s “general and speculative” arguments could not justify 
infringement of the First Amendment.129 
Breyer criticized, in particular, the judicially-generated 
“hypothetical claims” as:  
arguments that would deny First Amendment protection to the 
peaceful teaching of international human rights law on the ground 
that a little knowledge about ‘the international legal system’ is too 
dangerous a thing; that an opponent’s subsequent willingness to 
negotiate might be faked, so let’s not teach him how to try[.]130  
Expressing “serious doubt” about the statute’s constitutionality, Breyer 
would have construed the statute to prohibit “First–Amendment–
protected pure speech and association only when the defendant knows 
or intends that those activities will assist the organization’s unlawful 
terrorist actions.”131 
Humanitarian Law Project never references the “war on terror,”132 
“Al Qaeda,”133 or “September 11.” But the majority opinion evidences a 
 
 125 See id. at 2738. Similarly, the majority determined that teaching how to petition for 
“relief” before the United Nations could encompass relief in the form of money, which could be 
used to purchase weapons. Id. at 2729 (majority opinion). That determination ignored, 
however, clear statements by the plaintiffs that the relief sought was recognition under the 
Geneva Conventions and a denial that such relief would include monetary aid. See id. at 2739 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 126 Id. at 2729 (majority opinion). 
 127 Id. at 2739 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 378–79 
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled on other grounds by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 
444 (1969) (per curiam)). 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. at 2738. 
 131 Id. at 2739–40 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 132 Mary Dudziak attributes the lack of discussion to the fact that, by 2010, “the war on 
terror had less of a hold on American political consciousness.” DUDZIAK, supra note 12, at 124. 
And yet at that time, as Dudziak acknowledges, there were public disputes over the Islamic 
cultural center near Ground Zero and body scanners were placed in airports everywhere. See id. 
 133 At oral argument, the Justices pushed the plaintiffs’ lawyer, David Cole, on whether the 
government could ban the same sort of instruction if the terrorist groups were Al Qaeda or the 
Taliban. Transcript of Oral Argument at 22–24, Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 
(No. 08-1498). Cole suggested the matter might be different if these groups were involved 
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risk assessment that is assuredly a product of the 9/11 attacks. Without 
explicitly attributing it to the attacks, Roberts explained, greater latitude 
must be given to the government to prevent terrorist attacks. Roberts 
appeared to attribute the divide between the majority and the dissent to 
differing worldviews, or their own distinct cultural cognition.134 As 
Roberts described it, Breyer saw the world through rose-colored glasses. 
“[T]he dissent fails to address the real dangers at stake. It instead 
considers only the possible benefits of plaintiffs’ proposed activities in 
the abstract.”135 Breyer, explained Roberts, was naïve; he failed to 
understand how training in international law might be exploited by 
terrorist groups.136  
In the dissent’s world, such training is all to the good. Congress and 
the Executive, however, have concluded that we live in a different 
world: one in which the designated foreign terrorist organizations 
“are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to 
such an organization facilitates that conduct.”137  
Though Roberts did not name the attacks as his anchor for analysis or 
his heuristic, lower courts have been more forthcoming about their 
post-9/11 orientation and System 1 influences. 
B.     The “Post-9/11 World” 
In Bl(a)ck Tea Society v. City of Boston,138 the First Circuit 
addressed restrictions imposed by the city of Boston on protesters at the 
2004 Democratic National Convention.139 The city confined protesters 
to a “demonstration zone,” which amounted to a chain link and mesh 90 
feet by 300 feet “enclosed space” or “a pen.”140 The court affirmed the 
district court’s denial of a motion for preliminary injunction seeking 
modification of the zone.141 Though the majority did not refer to the 
9/11 attacks as a factor in its decision,142 Judge Kermit Lipez, in his 
concurring opinion, felt compelled to acknowledge its influence: 
 
because (1) the United States is at war with them; and (2) it is unclear whether Al Qaeda or the 
Taliban engage in any lawful activities. Id. at 30–31. 
 134 See Kahan, supra note 76, at 23. 
 135 Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2729. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. (quoting Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. 
No. 104-132, § 301(a)(7), 110 Stat. 1247). 
 138 378 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. at 10–11. 
 141 Id. at 15. 
 142 The district court did, however, emphasize the convention would be the first one to 
follow the 9/11 attacks and that they originated from Boston’s Logan Airport. See Coal. to 
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Inevitably, the events of 9/11 and the constant reminders in the 
popular media of security alerts color perceptions of the risks around 
us, including the perceptions of judges. The risks of violence and the 
dire consequences of that violence seem more probable and more 
substantial than they were before 9/11. When judges are asked to 
assess these risks in the First Amendment balance, we must candidly 
acknowledge that they may weigh more than they once did.143 
Judge Lipez’s admission was an articulation of his own cultural 
cognition or the post-9/11 heuristic. He now saw facts differently. In 
light of his cultural worldview, “the events of 9/11,” Lipez explained, he 
would fall prey to the availability heuristic (“the constant 
reminders . . . of security alerts”) and probability neglect (“risks of 
violence . . . seem more probable”).144 But, Lipez stated, courts should be 
forthright about their new orientation and its impact on balancing of 
security and civil liberty.145 
Similarly, in United States v. Aukai, an en banc Ninth Circuit held 
that permitting a person “to revoke consent to an ongoing airport 
security search makes little sense in a post-9/11 world.”146 Thus, the 
court rejected the defendant’s appeal of his conviction for possession of 
methamphetamines.147 Judge Graber, in her concurrence, took issue 
with the “irrelevant and distracting references to 9/11 and terrorists.”148 
The majority insisted, however, that “the present threat of organized 
terrorists using the 9/11 tactic” was relevant to determining the 
reasonableness of the search.149 To omit reference to 9/11 and the 
terrorist threat would be “speculative.”150 Citing George Orwell, the 
court warned, “[w]e should also be wary to eliminate historical facts 
such as 9/11.”151 
The dispute between the majority and the concurrence centered on 
how the different judges viewed facts and the law in a “post-9/11 world.” 
Judge Graber considered the references superfluous because the case 
concerned a man convicted of drug possession, not terrorism.152 For the 
 
Protest the Democratic Nat’l Convention v. City of Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d 61, 64 (D. Mass. 
2004), aff’d sub nom., Bl(a)ck Tea Soc’y, 378 F.3d 8. 
 143 Bl(a)ck Tea Soc’y, 378 F.3d at 19 (Lipez, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 144 Id. 
 145 See id. 
 146 497 F.3d 955, 960 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). The court made further findings of fact that 
allowing revocation of consent would assist terrorists in their planning. See id. at 960–61. 
 147 Id. at 955. 
 148 Id. at 963 (Graber, J., concurring). Graber argued that linking the holding to 9/11 would 
make it “dependent on the existence of the current terrorist threat, inviting future litigants to 
retest the viability of that holding.” Id. at 964. 
 149 Id. at 960 n.6 (majority opinion). 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. (citing GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 248 (1949)) (“Who controls the present controls the 
past. . . .” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 152 Id. at 963 (Graber, J., concurring). 
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majority, on the other hand, 9/11 could not be ignored. The majority 
argued that the screening procedures were authorized by legislation 
passed in response to the 9/11 attacks.153 But more importantly, the 
majority maintained it had to explain “why” it decided the case the way 
it did.154 For the majority, its holding could not be separated from the 
fact that 9/11 occurred and that a terrorist threat persisted.155 
Aukai demonstrates how the “post-9/11 world” is a form of 
cultural cognition; the attacks permeate the judges’ worldviews. 
Through that perspective, judges analyze the reasonableness of any 
security action with the attacks in mind, even when the facts at issue do 
not concern terrorism threats. 
Other judges also echo Chief Justice Roberts’s admonition not to 
forget “that we live in a different world” now.156 In News & Observer 
Publishing Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Authority, the Fourth Circuit 
affirmed a district court’s summary judgment decision that an airport’s 
total ban on newspaper racks inside its terminals violated the First 
Amendment.157 Invoking “common sense” that “security is of 
paramount importance at airports in our post-9/11 world,”158 Judge 
Andre Davis, in his dissent, criticized the majority for relying on a 
Fourth Circuit 1993 decision159 holding that the risk posed by 
newspaper racks was “de minimis.”160 The majority, Judge Davis 
declared, ignored the 1993 case’s “proper context: it predates September 
11, 2001.”161 Put simply, pre-9/11 case law does not speak to the post-
9/11 world.162 It is a historical artifact. It should no longer be employed 
as a heuristic through which to analyze present facts. Relying on such 
precedent, the dissent argued, was poor risk assessment.163 As a result, 
Judge Davis, and other judges, would appear to argue that 
 
 153 Id. at 960 n.6 (majority opinion) (referring to the Aviation Transportation Security Act, 
Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 110, 115 Stat. 597, 614–15 (2001)). 
 154 Id. (emphasis added). 
 155 See id. at 960–61. 
 156 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2729 (2010). 
 157 News & Observer Publ’g Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570 (4th Cir. 
2010). 
 158 Id. at 589 (Davis, J., dissenting). 
 159 See Multimedia Publ’g Co. of S.C. v. Greenville-Spartanburg Airport Dist., 991 F.2d 154 
(4th Cir. 1993). 
 160 News & Observer Publ’g Co., 597 F.3d at 589 (Davis, J., dissenting) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 161 Id. 
 162 Adrian Vermeule describes the incongruence of law with a crisis as a general problem 
with “common law emergency oversight.” Adrian Vermeule, Holmes on Emergencies, 61 STAN. 
L. REV. 163, 194 (2008) (quoting William E. Scheuerman, Emergency Powers, 2 ANN. REV. L. & 
SOC. SCI. 257, 265–70 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Emergencies are novel 
situations, so the informational value of precedent is reduced.” Id. at 197. 
 163 News & Observer Publ’g Co., 597 F.3d at 589–90 (Davis, J., dissenting). 
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acknowledging the “post-9/11 world” (and its laws) may supersede or 
overrule the pre-9/11 world (and its laws).164 
C.     Common Sense and System 1 Thinking About Terrorism 
Post-9/11 opinions often evidence as much System 1 thinking as 
System 2 thinking. Roberts suggested in Humanitarian Law Project that 
basic “common sense” holds “that material support of a terrorist group’s 
lawful activities facilitates the group’s ability to attract ‘funds,’ 
‘financing,’ and ‘goods’ that will further its terrorist acts.”165 But the 
appeal to “common sense” was Roberts’s own personal policy judgment 
or his intuitive or System 1 response. It also amounted to drawing 
factual inferences, the very determination that he disclaimed the 
aptitude as a judge to do.166 
The invocation of common sense also implicitly acknowledges the 
tenuous connection between teaching international humanitarian law 
for peaceful purposes and supporting terrorism. As Brest notes, it is in 
uncertain areas that courts rely too heavily on System 1.167 Richard 
Posner has argued that assessing the national security risks posed by 
providing habeas to suspected terrorists is precisely the sort of claim 
that must be resolved by a judge’s intuition.168 Posner characterizes a 
judge’s use of “common sense” “as a set of policy judgments that 
everyone agrees on and so are not thought political at all.”169 But of 
course they are. As we have seen, these sorts of System 1 responses are 
also a product of cultural worldviews. One judge’s common sense is not 
often another’s. 
Consider Ashcroft v. Iqbal,170 a Supreme Court case concerning the 
liability of government officials for abusive counterterrorism 
measures.171 Two months after the 9/11 attacks, Javaid Iqbal, a Pakistani 
Muslim, was arrested on immigration fraud related charges and then 
detained for six months as a person of “high interest” to the 9/11 
investigation only, he alleged, because of “his race, religion, or national 
 
 164 Id.; see also Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Port of Portland, Or., No. CV04695HU, 2005 WL 
1109698, at *9 (D. Or. May 5, 2005) (“Moreover, in the post-September 11, 2001 world, air 
travel is more encumbered than it was when Lee [v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 
U.S. 830 (1992)] was decided, providing airports with an even stronger interest in regulating 
non-travel related interferences with passengers.”), aff’d, 172 F. App’x 760 (9th Cir. 2006).  
 165 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2726 n.6 (2010). 
 166 Id. at 2727. 
 167 Brest, supra note 26, at 485. 
 168 See POSNER, supra note 97, at 116. Posner contends that judges revert to “their intuitions, 
because the empirical challenges to their intuitions do not have the force required to dislodge 
those intuitions.” Id. 
 169 Id. at 116–17. 
 170 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 171 Id. 
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origin.”172 The Court ruled 5-4 in Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion 
that Iqbal’s complaint failed to state claims upon which relief could be 
granted.173 
Relying on his “judicial experience and common sense,”174 
Kennedy found implausible the allegations that Mueller and Ashcroft 
discriminated in directing the arrest and detention of thousands of Arab 
Muslim men, and their restrictive confinement, as part of the 9/11 
investigation.175 In light of the role played by Arab Muslims in the 9/11 
attacks, Kennedy explained, “[i]t should come as no surprise that a 
legitimate policy directing law enforcement to arrest and detain 
individuals because of their suspected link to the attacks would produce 
a disparate, incidental impact on Arab Muslims, even though the 
purpose of the policy was to target neither Arabs nor Muslims.”176 Yet 
Kennedy pointed to no link between Iqbal and the 9/11 terrorists save 
for “their Muslim faith and ethnic background.”177 But Kennedy’s own 
“judicial experience and common sense” determination revealed the 
limits of his own biases and cultural myopia; what he missed in Iqbal’s 
discrimination claim was that Iqbal was not an Arab but a Pakistani.178 
Kennedy’s “common sense” response here is also a byproduct of 
his own cultural cognition and emotional responses to risk, and how the 
government should address terrorism. Cultural cognition has significant 
implications for how civil liberties and their infringement may be 
tolerated. Researchers have found that people concerned about various 
dangers, including future terrorist attacks after 9/11, are more willing to 
sacrifice their own civil liberties and the rights of others whom they 
believe pose a threat, than people who do not perceive the same societal 
threats.179 People who are more trusting of the government are also 
more willing to sacrifice their civil liberties.180 Christina Wells similarly 
 
 172 Id. at 662. 
 173 Id. at 663. 
 174 Id. at 679 (citing Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2007), reversed and 
remanded by 556 U.S. 662). 
 175 Id. at 682. 
 176 Id. 
 177 See Ramzi Kassem, Implausible Realities: Iqbal’s Entrenchment of Majority Group 
Skepticism Towards Discrimination Claims, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1443, 1452–53 (2010). 
 178 See Aziz Z. Huq, Against National Security Exceptionalism, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 225, 250–
51 (2010) (“Categorizing a Pakistani as an Arab, as Justice Kennedy does, is about as accurate as 
calling an American ‘European’ based on a perception of shared ethnic heritage. The Court’s 
opinion thus rests on the very act of plainly erroneous racial miscategorization that Iqbal 
attacked as invidious.” (footnote omitted)). 
 179 ADAM J. BERINSKY, IN TIME OF WAR: UNDERSTANDING AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION 
FROM WORLD WAR II TO IRAQ 160 (2009) (discussing Darren W. Davis & Brian D. Silver, Civil 
Liberties vs. Security: Public Opinion in the Context of the Terrorist Attacks on America, 48 AM. 
J. POL. SCI. 28 (2004)); GEORGE E. MARCUS ET AL., WITH MALICE TOWARD SOME: HOW PEOPLE 
MAKE CIVIL LIBERTIES JUDGMENTS (1995); JOHN L. SULLIVAN ET AL., POLITICAL TOLERANCE 
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1982). 
 180 BERINSKY, supra note 179, at 162 (citing Davis & Silver, supra note 179). 
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concludes, based upon her review of psychological research, that, “left to 
their own devices in times of stress, people, including judges, tend to 
vastly exaggerate and react against the threats posed by disfavored 
groups.”181 
In the post-9/11 context, judges are more likely to defer to the 
government’s assessment of risks. Courts will therefore be even less 
receptive to claims of discrimination.182 As Ramzi Kassem observes, “the 
subjective, common sense standard applied by the judiciary will likely 
tilt towards mainstream, majority group views that include a dose of 
skepticism towards claims of invidious discrimination against minority 
groups, particularly unpopular, insular ones.”183 Whatever the merits to 
civil rights litigation that Kennedy acknowledged (“[l]itigation, though 
necessary to ensure that officials comply with the law”),184 he did not 
countenance diverting government resources to respond to such 
discrimination claims “when Government officials are charged with 
responding to . . . ‘a national and international security emergency 
unprecedented in the history of the American Republic.’”185 Thus we see 
that a court’s “common sense” perceptions of terrorism threats do not 
bode well for abuse claims relating to the government’s 
counterterrorism measures.186 
D.     The Availability Heuristic Post-9/11 
Courts invariably reach for what is available in analyzing risks 
posed by terrorism. In Humanitarian Law Project, Roberts’s location 
and invocation of the book Blood and Belief reflected a judicial reversion 
to the availability heuristic and also confirmation bias.187 Following his 
 
 181 Christina E. Wells, Fear and Loathing in Constitutional Decision-Making, 2005 WIS. L. 
REV. 115, 119; see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 209 (“Stereotyping of groups significantly 
increases when people are in a state of fear . . . .”). 
 182 But see Haddad v. Ashcroft, 221 F. Supp. 2d 799 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (holding that a secret 
deportation hearing violated Lebanese alien’s due process rights and that he must have his case 
heard before a different immigration judge), vacated as moot, 76 F. App’x 672 (6th Cir. 2003). 
The district court observed that after 9/11 “individuals (including some in government) are 
more willing to abridge the constitutional rights of people who are perceived to share 
something in common with the ‘enemy,’ either because of their race, ethnicity, or beliefs.” Id. at 
804. 
 183 Kassem, supra note 177, at 1454; see also Huq, supra note 178, at 250. 
 184 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685 (2009). 
 185 Id. (quoting Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 179 (2d Cir. 2007) (Cabranes, J., concurring), 
reversed and remanded by 556 U.S. 662). 
 186 See Stephen I. Vladeck, The New National Security Canon, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1295 (2012) 
(observing that no court has awarded damages for claims relating to post-9/11 terrorism 
measures). 
 187 Roberts’s fact-finding outside the record and briefs of the parties is not unique to 
terrorism cases. Over the last fifteen years, more than one hundred Supreme Court opinions 
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intuition, Roberts sought out evidence that supported his viewpoint.188 
He extrapolated from the book a plausible narrative account, purporting 
to validate it in historical “fact.” But what is “possible” is not evidence of 
probability.189 And a coherent account does not a good basis for 
prediction make. Kahneman observes that “uncritical substitution of 
plausibility for probability has pernicious effects on judgments when 
scenarios are used as tools of forecasting.”190 Moreover, Roberts’s 
selection of particular facts that were not submitted by the government 
or a part of the record is inconsistent with rationales supporting judicial 
deference.191 Instead, the fact-finding is the very sort of judgment 
Roberts insisted courts were not competent to make.192 
Dissenting in Boumediene v. Bush, in which the Court held 5-4 that 
detainees at Guantanamo Bay had a constitutional right to habeas,193 
Justice Scalia similarly employed the availability heuristic in describing 
vividly the harm that the decision would cause.194 
America is at war with radical Islamists. The enemy began by killing 
Americans and American allies abroad: 241 at the Marine barracks in 
Lebanon, 19 at the Khobar Towers in Dhahran, 224 at our embassies 
in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi, and 17 on the USS Cole in Yemen. On 
September 11, 2001, the enemy brought the battle to American soil, 
killing 2,749 at the Twin Towers in New York City, 184 at the 
Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and 40 in Pennsylvania. It has 
threatened further attacks against our homeland; one need only walk 
about buttressed and barricaded Washington, or board a plane 
anywhere in the country, to know that the threat is a serious one. 
Our Armed Forces are now in the field against the enemy, in 
 
asserted facts based on “outside” sources. Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact 
Finding, 98 VA. L. REV. 1255, 1262–63 (2012). 
 188 Allison Orr Larsen suggests that one danger of judicial fact-finding in the digital age—
separate and apart from seeking sources that confirm viewpoints—is that because of the 
personalization of search results on the Internet, a judge “will only find factual authorities to 
support what it is she wants to argue.” Id. at 1294 (discussing the effects of “filter bubble”). 
 189 See Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“‘Valid empirical proof 
requires not merely the establishment of possibility, but an estimate of probability.’” (quoting 
DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, HISTORIANS’ FALLACIES: TOWARD A LOGIC OF HISTORICAL 
THOUGHT 53 (1970))). 
 190 KAHNEMAN, supra note 22, at 159, 218 (citing NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK 
SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE (2007)) (observing that “our tendency to 
construct and believe coherent narratives of the past makes it difficult for us to accept the limits 
of our forecasting ability”). 
 191 See infra Part IV (discussing arguments in favor of judicial deference). 
 192 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2727 (2010) (“But when it comes to 
collecting evidence and drawing factual inferences in this area, ‘the lack of competence on the 
part of the courts is marked’ . . . .” (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 65 (1981))). 
 193 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 194 Id. at 827 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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Afghanistan and Iraq. Last week, 13 of our countrymen in arms were 
killed.195 
By granting the detainees habeas, Scalia warned, Americans would be 
killed.196 Scalia’s selective adoption of information from outside the 
record evidenced fact-finding based on what was available to him in 
making a risk assessment. First, Scalia offered his own personal, 
common sense perception of the risk based on local and airport security 
measures.197 Second, his account was also a product of a cultural 
worldview that broadened the enemy beyond Al Qaeda to include all of 
radical Islam and identified the origins of the war on terrorism almost 
two decades earlier, claims that were not made by the government.198 
His detailed, violent history and plausible forecast of resulting American 
deaths could also lead people to think his predicted outcome was more 
probable than in actuality.199 
III.     RISK AVERSION AND THE PRESUMPTION OF IMMINENCE 
This Part examines how courts express and rationalize probability 
neglect and other System 1-related cognitive errors in their System 2-
reasoned opinions. The biases are still apparent—albeit refined—
through hypothetical scenarios, reduced standards of evidence, and legal 
analyses such as the special needs doctrine. What is almost always 
missing from these opinions, however, is the acknowledgment of the 
animating fears and potential biases. 
Probability neglect is not unique to post-9/11 jurisprudence. 
Indeed, it appears that at times of crisis and through the special needs 
doctrine, the Supreme Court has long sanctioned probability neglect as 
 
 195 Id. (citations omitted). 
 196 Id. 
 197 Id. 
 198 See H. Robert Baker, The Supreme Court Confronts History: Or, Habeas Corpus Redivivus, 
COMMON-PLACE (July 2008), http://www.common-place.org/vol-08/no-04/talk. Joe Margulies 
has criticized the type of terrorist description that Scalia lays out “as the latest, and by far the 
most dangerous iteration of a lurking, apocalyptic danger posed by a subhuman predator that 
threatens to overwhelm the American public, and for which the American public demands the 
prompt elimination of all risk.” Joseph Margulies, Deviance, Risk, and Law: Reflections on the 
Demand for the Preventive Detention of Suspected Terrorists, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
729, 769 (2011). 
 199 See KAHNEMAN, supra note 22, at 159–60 (describing the distinction between plausibility 
and probability); SUNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 82 (discussing “alarmist bias”). The Senate 
Minority Report, cited by Scalia, put the number of recidivating Guantanamo detainees at 
thirty. S. REP. NO. 110-90, pt. 7, at 13 (2007). But various other sources of course provide 
different estimates. See John Monahan, The Individual Risk Assessment of Terrorism, 18 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 167, 177 (2012) (citations omitted) (estimating released Guantanamo 
detainees’ “postrelease rate of actual or suspected terrorism” “between 6% and 25%” (citations 
omitted)). The uncertainty and variability of these estimates demonstrates in part the problem 
with Scalia’s presentation of information as empirical findings of fact. 
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an analytical tool. Such thinking reflects what Joe Margulies has 
described as part of America’s “cultural hostility to risk,” a 
predisposition that is amplified during crises.200 
That hostility to risk—and its partner, probability neglect—is 
similarly reflected in the permissive evidentiary standards crafted by the 
current courts. In Humanitarian Law Project Roberts accepted as a 
foregone conclusion that acts of terrorism are very likely when he 
invoked the government need “to prevent imminent harms.”201 The 
reference to “imminent harms” is jarring;202 nowhere in the opinion was 
there any discussion of the likelihood of a terrorist attack. There was no 
basis for believing an attack was imminent. This was simply Roberts’s 
default position in the face of uncertain harm. 
The presumption of imminence ups the stakes. In so doing Roberts 
presented the Court with a form of the ticking time bomb 
hypothetical,203 or the “one percent doctrine.”204 That is, whatever the 
odds really may be, and we cannot know what they are, we should 
assume and act as though an attack is about to occur. 
The standard permits just about any imagined outcome to justify 
the prohibition of speech to a designated foreign terrorist group. It is 
also then an invitation to always err on the side of the government and 
feed cognitive errors and emotions rather than facilitate more 
deliberative reflection. Though the post-9/11 risk of terrorism may be 
different from prior threats, the Supreme Court has historically adopted 
the worst-case scenario, presuming imminence in times of perceived 
existential dangers. 
A.     Historical Examples of Presumed Imminence 
In Korematsu v. United States, the Court upheld the exclusion and 
internment of over 112,000 Japanese Americans on the grounds of the 
elastic idea of military necessity.205 Writing for the six-justice majority, 
Justice Black justified the decision based upon deference to the 
 
 200 Margulies, supra note 198, at 770. 
 201 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2728 (2010) (emphasis added). 
 202 Id. 
 203 In the post-9/11 era, the ticking time bomb hypothetical has been frequently raised to ask 
when torture might be justified. In his thorough critique of the question, David Luban observes 
that because any torture might help us in fighting terrorism: “[W]e verge on declaring all 
military threats and adversaries that menace American civilians to be ticking bombs whose 
defeat justifies torture.” David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. 
REV. 1425, 1443 (2005). 
 204 The “one percent doctrine,” or “Cheney Doctrine” as it was also characterized, held that 
“‘[e]ven if there’s just a one percent chance of the unimaginable coming due, act as if it is a 
certainty.’” RON SUSKIND, THE ONE PERCENT DOCTRINE: DEEP INSIDE AMERICA’S PURSUIT OF 
ITS ENEMIES SINCE 9/11, at 62 (2006) (quoting Dick Cheney). 
 205 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
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military’s determination “that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be 
segregated from the West Coast” because the “disloyal members of that 
population . . . could not be precisely and quickly ascertained.”206 
Writing in dissent, Justice Murphy would have required the government 
to show that a constitutional deprivation based on “military necessity” 
“is reasonably related to a public danger that is so ‘immediate, 
imminent, and impending’ as not to admit of delay and not to permit 
the intervention of ordinary constitutional processes to alleviate the 
danger,” before simply accepting the military’s judgment.207 
The near-total deference and lack of any evidentiary requirement 
aided the Court in its approval of “obvious racial discrimination.”208 
Looking back at his vote upholding the exclusion, Justice Douglas 
acknowledged that psychological and social fears and biases inevitably 
played a role in the decision. The Court’s “‘members are very much a 
part of the community and know the fears, anxieties, craving and wishes 
of their neighbors . . . . [T]he state of public opinion will often make the 
Court cautious when it should be bold.’”209 
Dennis v. United States, in which the Court upheld convictions of 
American Communist party leaders for conspiring to “advocate and 
teach the duty and necessity of overthrowing and destroying the 
Government of the United States by force and violence,”210 also 
prescribed an approach to national security matters that permitted 
worst-case scenarios to trump lack of evidence of probability or 
imminence.211 Unsatisfied with earlier iterations of the “clear and 
present danger” test,212 which the Dennis Court determined were not 
apposite because they did not deal with a “substantial threat to the safety 
 
 206 Id. at 218–19, 223–24. 
 207 Id. at 234 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Russell, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 
623, 627 (1871), abrogated by Doe v. United States, 95 Fed. Cl. 546 (2010)) (citing Raymond v. 
Thomas, 91 U.S. 712, 716 (1875); Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 134, 135 (1851), 
abrogated by Doe, 95 Fed. Cl. 546). 
 208 Id.; see also id. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“But once a judicial opinion rationalizes 
such an order to show that it conforms to the Constitution, or rather rationalizes the 
Constitution to show that the Constitution sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has 
validated the principle of racial discrimination in criminal procedure and of transplanting 
American citizens.”). 
 209 GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME, FROM THE SEDITION 
ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 304 (2004) (quoting WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE 
COURT YEARS 1939–1975: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 38 (1980)). 
 210 341 U.S. 494, 512 (1951). 
 211 Id. at 510. 
 212 The Dennis Court explained that “clear and present danger” could not  
mean that before the Government may act, it must wait until the putsch is about to 
be executed, the plans have been laid and the signal is awaited. If Government is 
aware that a group aiming at its overthrow is attempting to indoctrinate its members 
and to commit them to a course whereby they will strike when the leaders feel the 
circumstances permit, action by the Government is required. 
Id. at 509. 
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of the community” (such as the existential crisis posed by 
Communism), the Court adopted Judge Learned Hand’s rule, crafted in 
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.213 The rule provided that 
for cases involving free speech, courts “must ask whether the gravity of 
the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free 
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.”214 Under this analysis, 
however, what the rule permitted was that the graver the danger or 
perceived harm, a lesser probability of such harm was required in order 
to uphold the government action.215 Thus, the Dennis Court articulated 
an iteration of the “clear and present danger” test that operationalized 
cognitive errors such as probability neglect.216 
Brandenburg v. Ohio,217 invoked by Breyer in his Humanitarian 
Law Project dissent, seemingly overruled the Dennis test.218 The 
Brandenburg Court held unconstitutional the proscription of advocacy 
of the use of force unless it “is directed to inciting or producing 
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”219 
Probability thus becomes a more significant concern, at least under First 
Amendment analysis. Yet as Humanitarian Law Project suggests, a 
variant of the Dennis rule, or its psychological antecedents, is alive and 
well. The threat of catastrophic attack weighs heavily on Justices, 
justifying, it would seem, government restrictions on civil liberties, 
notwithstanding a low or unidentified probability. 
B.     Special Needs Cases 
The Supreme Court’s special needs line of cases also evidences a 
general willingness on the part of courts to ignore calculations of 
probability or require specific evidence where the potential harm is 
 
 213 Id. at 510. 
 214 Id. (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), aff’d, 341 U.S. 494) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 215 Wells, supra note 181, at 151–52. As Wells observes, Judge Hand, in his application of the 
test, took “judicial notice of world events that were unrelated to the [Communist Party of the 
USA (CPUSA)]” in determining that the evil of government overthrow was probable. 
Imminence becomes a function of CPUSA’s evil character. 
 216 See id. at 159–64 (theorizing that perceptions of CPUSA’s dangerousness might have 
become exaggerated through probability neglect and/or intolerance owing to prejudice). 
 217 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). 
 218 Id. at 450 (Black, J., concurring) (“I join the Court’s opinion, which, as I understand it, 
simply cites [Dennis], but does not indicate any agreement on the Court’s part with the ‘clear 
and present danger’ doctrine on which Dennis purported to rely.” (citation omitted)); id. at 454 
(Douglas, J., concurring) (“I see no place in the regime of the First Amendment for any ‘clear 
and present danger’ test, whether strict and tight as some would make it, or free-wheeling as the 
Court in Dennis rephrased it.”). 
 219 Id. at 447 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). 
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great.220 For example, in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von 
Raab, the Supreme Court upheld 5-4 the United States Customs 
Service’s required urinalysis testing for all those seeking certain 
promotions or transfer to certain positions in the service.221 Justice 
Kennedy, writing for the majority, explained that where “the possible 
harm against which the Government seeks to guard is substantial, the 
need to prevent its occurrence furnishes an ample justification for 
reasonable searches calculated to advance the Government’s goal.”222 
Justice Scalia dissented, objecting to the lack of evidence supporting a 
high level of drug use, or that such drug use presented a serious harm.223 
Attributing the policy to only a “generalization” that drug use pervades 
all workplaces, Scalia indicated he would, however, accept simplification 
where “catastrophic social harm” is involved and “no risk whatever is 
tolerable.”224 
Applying the special needs analysis to post-9/11 suspicionless 
searches of ferries, then-judge Sonia Sotomayor stressed “that the 
government, in its attempt to counteract the threat of terrorism, need 
not show that every airport or every ferry terminal is threatened by 
terrorism in order to implement a nationwide security policy.”225 It was 
of no consequence to the court’s special needs analysis that “Lake 
Champlain ferries are a less obvious terrorist target than ferries 
in . . . New York City or Los Angeles.”226 “[P]revention of terrorist 
attacks on large vessels”—the special need—overrides the need for any 
specific findings of threat.227 
Thus, in high-risk contexts, we see a judicial propensity to weight 
the harm heavily in disregard of evidence supporting the probability or 
imminence of that harm. Special needs cases seem to reify the “gravity 
of the evil” analysis of Dennis.228 How could the prevention of terrorism 
 
 220 See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 74 (2001). The special needs 
doctrine requires the balancing of the intrusion of privacy against the special needs of the 
government, which must be distinct from general law enforcement objectives. Id. at 78–79. 
 221 489 U.S. 656 (1989). 
 222 Id. at 674–75. Justice Kennedy stated it was this principle that justified searching all bags 
of people boarding airplanes without any individualized suspicion. Id. at 675 n.3 (“‘When the 
risk is the jeopardy to hundreds of human lives and millions of dollars of property inherent in 
the pirating or blowing up of a large airplane, that danger alone meets the test of 
reasonableness . . . .’” (quoting United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1974))). 
 223 Id. at 681–85 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 681 (“[N]either frequency of use nor 
connection to harm is demonstrated or even likely.”). 
 224 Id. at 684. For Justice Scalia, the “secured areas of a nuclear power plant” would present a 
circumstance allowing for such generality. 
 225 Cassidy v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 67, 83 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 226 Id. 
 227 Id. at 82. 
 228 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951) (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 
F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), aff’d, 341 U.S. 494). 
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be anything but a special need that would render government efforts, 
however intrusive, reasonable? 
C.     Terrorism Hypotheticals 
The Supreme Court has also hypothesized in several cases that the 
threat of terrorism could demand deference to the political branches 
and diminish civil liberties protections. In City of Indianapolis v. 
Edmond, the Court struck down a suspicionless checkpoint intended to 
catch drug offenders as a violation of the Fourth Amendment because 
its primary purpose was crime control.229 However, Justice O’Connor, 
writing for the Court, approved of the Seventh Circuit’s assumption, in 
its opinion below, that an otherwise criminal objective would not 
preclude setting up a suspicionless checkpoint in an emergency 
situation such as “an imminent terrorist attack.”230 
The Seventh Circuit’s full factual scenario involved “a credible tip 
that a car loaded with dynamite and driven by an unidentified terrorist 
was en route to downtown Indianapolis,” leading the Indianapolis 
police to “block[] all the roads to the downtown area even though this 
would amount to stopping thousands of drivers without suspecting any 
one of them of criminal activity.”231 Judge Posner explained that 
suspicionless checks would not offend the Fourth Amendment because 
“[w]hen urgent considerations of the public safety require compromise 
with the normal principles constraining law enforcement, the normal 
principles may have to bend. The Constitution is not a suicide pact.”232 
Posner’s hypothetical involved an imminent attack; therefore, the 
probability of a terrorist attack was high. This is the proverbial ticking 
time bomb. The problem with the hypothetical is that it writes into the 
equation a level of high probability. What level of urgency is there if it is 
unclear where or when the terrorist attack may be perpetrated? 
Justice Souter answered this question five years later with his own 
revealing hypothetical. In Illinois v. Caballes, the Court held that the use 
of a narcotics detecting dog outside of a car in connection with a lawful 
traffic stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment.233 Justice Souter 
dissented, contending that the dog sniff constituted an unauthorized 
search that was not justified.234 Yet Souter also saw fit to endorse a 
terrorism exception: 
 
 229 531 U.S. 32 (2000). 
 230 Id. at 44 (discussing Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F.3d 659, 662–63 (7th Cir. 1999), aff’d, 
531 U.S. 32). 
 231 Edmond, 183 F.3d at 663. 
 232 Id. 
 233 543 U.S. 405 (2005). 
 234 Id. at 410–11 (Souter, J., dissenting) (disputing the majority’s reasoning that a dog search 
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All of us are concerned not to prejudge a claim of authority to detect 
explosives and dangerous chemical or biological weapons that might 
be carried by a terrorist who prompts no individualized suspicion. 
Suffice it to say here that what is a reasonable search depends in part 
on demonstrated risk. Unreasonable sniff searches for marijuana are 
not necessarily unreasonable sniff searches for destructive or deadly 
material if suicide bombs are a societal risk.235 
Souter’s discussion of reasonableness appears rooted in a definition 
of risk that focuses on the potential harm, but is not concerned with the 
probability of that harm. Although he references a “demonstrated risk,” 
that evidence of risk appears more focused on the “destructive or 
deadly” outcome (“marijuana” vs. “suicide bombs”), not the likelihood. 
This calculus, which we as a society have seemed to accept as 
commonplace, is deeply rooted in probability neglect. Imminence is 
presumed. The bomb is always ticking.236 
D.     Post-9/11 Worst-Case Scenarios 
Since the 9/11 attacks, some lower courts have employed risk 
analyses that implicitly and explicitly consider worst-case scenarios. A 
worst-case scenario is essentially an imagining of the gravest evil.237 
These decisions, not unlike the Court’s hypotheticals or the Dennis test, 
are particularly susceptible to cognitive errors of probability neglect and 
the affect heuristic.238 
In its first ever written decision, the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court of Review addressed a Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA) court’s surveillance order that restricted law 
enforcement officials’ communications with intelligence officials 
regarding the surveillance and use of such surveillance for criminal 
 
did not intrude on the car passenger’s legitimate expectation of privacy because the dogs would 
only detect contraband, noting that “[t]he infallible dog, however, is a creature of legal fiction”). 
 235 Id. at 417 n.7; see also id. at 423 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“A dog sniff for explosives, 
involving security interests not presented here, would be an entirely different matter.”); id. at 
425 (“[T]he immediate, present danger of explosives would likely justify a bomb sniff under the 
special needs doctrine.”). 
 236 In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the Court’s last opinion written prior to the 
9/11 attacks, the Court held that a post-removal-period immigration detention statute did not 
authorize indefinite detention and must be read to limit an alien’s detention to a reasonable 
period. Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer also noted that if the Court were considering 
terrorism suspects, “special arguments might be made for forms of preventive detention and for 
heightened deference to the judgments of the political branches with respect to matters of 
national security.” Id. at 696. Breyer’s comments suggested a predisposition to accept a 
differently calibrated risk analysis when confronted with terrorism cases. 
 237 See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951) (quoting United States v. Dennis, 
183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), aff’d, 341 U.S. 494); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WORST-CASE 
SCENARIOS 18 (2007). 
 238 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 64–65. 
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prosecution.239 The court observed that while the threat may not be 
“dispositive,” it is “a crucial factor” in determining whether a search is 
“reasonable.”240 One can only imagine how crucial it was for this court. 
In the next sentence, the court speculated, “[o]ur case may well involve 
the most serious threat our country faces.”241 Again, the court’s 
apprehension of the potential harm—Learned Hand’s “gravity of the 
evil” in Dennis—appeared to overwhelm any other analysis of what was 
a reasonable search, including probability or imminence of an attack. 
In similar fashion, the Second Circuit upheld New York City’s 
random, suspicionless searches of peoples’ bags on the subway, 
explaining that where the danger of a terrorist attack was so great, 
“immediacy” and “a specific, extant threat” were not relevant under the 
special needs analysis.242 In another case, the Second Circuit upheld 
restrictions on political protesters at the Republican National 
Convention notwithstanding objections that the security risks were 
“unspecific” and “generic.”243 Instead of requiring a particularized or 
immediate threat, the court stated that government limitations of speech 
could be justified on the basis of “managing potential risks,” 
“consideration of the worst-case scenario,” and “possible security 
threats.”244 
A variant of the worst-case scenario also figured prominently in at 
least one D.C. Circuit judge’s evaluation of the standard of proof for 
determining whether a detainee at Guantanamo is a member of Al 
Qaeda or associated forces. Addressing the possible release of a 
terrorism suspect, Judge Laurence Silberman explained that “unusual 
incentives and disincentives” affected judges in their decisions 
concerning habeas for Guantanamo detainees.245 In contrast to the 
normal criminal case, in which a “good judge” might overturn a 
conviction where evidence is lacking even if she were certain of the 
defendant’s guilt, the detainee case presented a different risk analysis.246 
Silberman explained:  
 
 239 In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002). 
 240 Id. at 746. 
 241 Id. 
 242 MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 272 (2d Cir. 2006). Yet, the court then found the danger 
“sufficiently immediate,” referencing “the thwarted plots to bomb New York City’s subway 
system, its continued desirability as a target, and the recent bombings of public transportation 
systems in Madrid, Moscow, and London” as factual grounds for concluding that “the risk to 
public safety is substantial and real.” Id. 
 243 Marcavage v. City of New York, 689 F.3d 98, 105 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 244 Id. (citing Citizens for Peace in Space v. City of Colo. Springs, 477 F.3d 1212, 1223–24 
(10th Cir. 2007)). Noting that the convention was the first one after the 9/11 attacks, the court 
concluded that the possible risk of attack, in addition to the traffic and crowd challenges, 
demonstrated that the government had a compelling interest in security. Id. 
 245 Esmail v. Obama, 639 F.3d 1075, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Silberman, J., concurring). 
 246 Id. 
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When we are dealing with detainees, candor obliges me to admit that 
one can not help but be conscious of the infinitely greater downside 
risk to our country, and its people, of an order releasing a detainee 
who is likely to return to terrorism. One does not have to be a 
“Posnerian”—a believer that virtually all law and regulation should 
be judged in accordance with a cost/benefit analysis—to recognize 
this uncomfortable fact.247  
Therefore, Silberman reasoned, a “preponderance of [the] evidence” 
standard would be too burdensome.248 He speculated that none of his 
colleagues would “vote to grant a petition if he or she believes that it is 
somewhat likely that the petitioner is an al Qaeda adherent or an active 
supporter.”249 
Judge Silberman may have been only speculating, but it offers a 
glimpse into how at least one judge, and surely some of his colleagues, 
undertakes risk analysis. Strikingly, Silberman not only focused on the 
worst-case scenario, but maintained that a lower burden of proof, lower 
than what the government advocated, was necessary—making it less 
likely the “gravity of the evil” could be “discounted by its 
improbability.”250 
As we can see, in a post-9/11 world, a System 1 fear of terrorism 
and concomitant probability neglect might not be offset by System 2’s 
more deliberative faculties. As Kahneman has noted, where attitudes 
and beliefs are involved, which they assuredly are in the assessment of 
risk and related government responses, System 2 may instead function 
as an “apologist” or “endorser” of System 1 responses to terrorism.251 
Thus, in contemplating worst-case scenarios, judges may employ 
System 2 faculties to reduce evidentiary requirements for government 
action intended to prevent terrorism. 
E.     Lack of Exigency as a Basis for Judicial Review 
In light of judges’ susceptibility to biases, it may be surprising that 
the Supreme Court took as active a role as it did in the enemy 
combatant cases. However, the Court’s involvement can be explained in 
part by the relatively modest results in three of the cases that required a 
 
 247 Id. at 1077–78. Silberman’s reasoning may be viewed as a form of “weighted accuracy 
argument,” “in which the harms associated with a false negative are perceived to greatly 
outweigh the harms associated with a false positive.” Chesney, supra note 21, at 1414. 
 248 Esmail, 639 F.3d at 1078 (Silberman, J., concurring). 
 249 Id.; see infra Part V.A (discussing the D.C. Circuit’s conflation of the preponderance of 
evidence and substantial evidence standards). 
 250 See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951). 
 251 See KAHNEMAN, supra note 22, at 103–04. 
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hearing for detainees.252 But it may be better attributed to at least a 
majority of the Court’s view that the cases did not entail exigent 
circumstances or encroach on issues of military necessity that the 
Korematsu Court, for example, did perceive.253 Yet even this 
determination itself has entailed findings of fact. 
In Rasul v. Bush, a 6-3 majority held that there was federal habeas 
jurisdiction over detainees who were not from nations at war with the 
United States and might be held indefinitely at the U.S. Naval Base at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.254 Concurring, Justice Kennedy inferred from 
the base’s location outside of “any hostilities,”255 and the lengthy 
detention, a lack of exigency.256 Kennedy’s risk assessment here—his 
finding of a lack of imminence—was no less a product of biases and a 
personal policy preference than was Roberts’s presumption of 
imminence in Humanitarian Law Project. But for Kennedy, the lack of 
exigency was a necessary a priori finding. Without such, he might not 
have sanctioned judicial review. 
Four years later, in Boumediene, the Court held that the legislation 
crafted in response to Rasul stripped federal courts of habeas 
jurisdiction over the Guantanamo detainees’ petitions.257 The Court 
further held that detainees had a constitutional right to habeas and that 
the jurisdiction stripping provision amounted to an unconstitutional 
suspension of habeas.258 Writing for the majority, Kennedy concluded 
that “[t]he Government presents no credible arguments that the military 
mission at Guantanamo would be compromised if habeas corpus courts 
had jurisdiction to hear the detainees’ claims.”259 As in Rasul, Kennedy 
 
 252 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 211; see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) 
(holding that the process provided by the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) was an inadequate 
substitute for habeas corpus review); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (“[D]ue 
process demands that a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant be given a 
meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral 
decisionmaker.”); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004) (noting that the Court did not even 
decide “[w]hether and what further proceedings may become necessary after” the government 
responds to the detainees’ claims). 
 253 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218–19, 223–24 (1945). But see id. at 248 
(Jackson, J., dissenting) (“My duties as a justice . . . do not require me to make a military 
judgment as to whether General DeWitt’s evacuation and detention program was a reasonable 
military necessity.”). 
 254 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 470, 485. 
 255 Id. at 487 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 256 Id. at 488 (“It suggests a weaker case of military necessity . . . . [A]s the period of detention 
stretches from months to years, the case for continued detention to meet military exigencies 
becomes weaker.” (emphasis added)).  
 257 Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723. 
 258 Id. 
 259 Id. at 769. 
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inferred a lack of exigency or imminent harm from the now six years of 
detention for many of those held at Guantanamo.260 
The Court is more likely, however, to defer to the government, or 
even decline jurisdiction where a threat is perceived as imminent. 
Rumsfeld v. Padilla presented the question of whether the President had 
the authority to detain militarily an American citizen arrested in the 
United States, who, the President determined, had conspired with Al 
Qaeda to commit terrorist attacks in the United States,261 including 
detonating a dirty bomb in the United States.262 The government 
acknowledged that its motivation for removing him from the criminal 
justice system and detaining him incommunicado was “to try and find 
out everything he knows so that hopefully we can stop other terrorist 
acts.”263 In a 5-4 opinion, the Court avoided the issue and ruled that 
Padilla had improperly filed his habeas petition in the Southern District 
of New York (where he had been held in federal criminal custody).264 
Instead, the majority held Padilla should have filed in the District of 
South Carolina where he was held in a naval brig.265 
Declining jurisdiction allowed the Court to avoid reaching a 
decision that could have interfered with government efforts to prevent 
terrorism. Such denials of jurisdiction may be viewed as risk 
assessments sub silentio. But the stealth approach may amount to what 
Stephen Vladeck terms “passive-aggressive judicial review.”266 Thus, the 
Court’s post-9/11 decisions provided at times only structural space for 
the Court, with little prospect of the Justices striking down government 
measures, and effectively sanctioning the conduct.267 
IV.     THE INADEQUACY OF DEFERENCE IN THE POST-9/11 WORLD 
Errors in cognition and other biases owing to cultural cognition 
might be thought to buttress arguments in favor of judicial deference in 
the terrorism context. However, because deference does not mean total 
judicial abdication,268 deferring to government characterization of risk 
 
 260 See id. at 794, 797 (noting six years of detention without judicial review); see also id. at 
800–01 (Souter, J., concurring) (same). 
 261 Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 430 (2004). 
 262 See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 701 (2d Cir. 2003), reversed and remanded by 542 
U.S. 426. 
 263 542 U.S. at 464 n.9 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 
F. Supp. 2d 564, 573–74 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 264 Id. at 429–30 (majority opinion). 
 265 Id. at 432, 436–37, 446. 
 266 Vladeck, supra note 19, at 140. The Supreme Court’s holding that lawyers, activists, and 
reporters lacked standing to challenge § 702 of FISA offers another variant of silent or passive-
aggressive risk assessment. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). 
 267 See Vladeck, supra note 19, at 140. 
 268 See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2727 (2010). 
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assessments can reinforce and even compound cognitive errors and 
biases endemic to the government’s initial risk assessment. The factual 
findings relating to terrorism threats also have significant constitutional 
implications for civil liberties in the post-9/11 world.269 
As we have seen, courts often undertake their own fact-finding and 
risk assessment to support their decision to defer. Moreover, 
government terrorism experts are also susceptible to cognitive errors 
and the biases of cultural cognition.270 They are also very much subject 
to concerns over political or public outcry and blameworthiness, which 
may lead them to overestimate the probability of attacks and ignore civil 
liberties concerns.271 This Part examines the differing rationales for 
judicial deference and ultimately rejects each of them as untenable. 
First, deference proponents contend that because emergencies and 
national security crises are of some fixed and limited duration, the 
harms affecting civil liberties will be confined in similar scope; therefore, 
courts need not intervene. Chief Justice William Rehnquist sketched out 
this historical argument in All the Laws but One, describing how the 
Court has generally issued decisions favoring civil liberty only after 
hostilities ceased.272 Similarly, Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule 
contend that eventually following a crisis, “the government will 
downgrade its threat assessment, and judges will worry less and less 
about the harms of blocking emergency measures.”273 
Arguments favoring judicial abdication because of temporary and 
possibly exigent circumstances are less persuasive in light of the seeming 
permanence of the terrorism threat.274 It is hardly clear when the threat 
 
 269 See Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of 
Rights, 84 IOWA L. REV. 941, 953–54 (1999) (observing how courts’ acceptance of facts and 
evidence influences decisions in constitutional balancing of interests). 
 270 See MUELLER & STEWART, supra note 5, at 13–20; A. Peter McGraw, Alexander Todorov 
& Howard Kunreuther, A Policy Maker’s Dilemma: Preventing Terrorism or Preventing Blame, 
115 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 25 (2011). 
 271 See McGraw, Todorov & Kunreuther, supra note 270, at 27–29. 
 272 WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME (1998). 
 273 ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, 
AND THE COURTS 42 (2007); see also DUDZIAK, supra note 12, at 81 (quoting POSNER & 
VERMEULE, supra, at 42). 
 274 See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 770–71, 797–98 (2008) (“[T]he cases before 
us lack any precise historical parallel” and the war on terrorism “is already among the longest 
wars in American history. . . . Because our Nation’s past military conflicts have been of limited 
duration, it has been possible to leave the outer boundaries of war powers undefined. If, as 
some fear, terrorism continues to pose dangerous threats to us for years to come, the Court 
might not have this luxury.”); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (“If the practical 
circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that informed the 
development of the law of war, that understanding may unravel.”); see also Vladeck, supra note 
19, at 136 (“The critical point for present purposes is the unique intersection of the war on 
terrorism’s temporal indeterminacy with its merger of the military and criminal paradigms.”). 
President Obama’s May 2013 call to “define the nature and scope of this struggle, or else it will 
define us,” has not altered the fact that he perceives ongoing significant terrorist threats 
requiring a “comprehensive counterterrorism strategy.” Barack Obama, President of the United 
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of terrorism will abate. While the government may no doubt be viewed 
as a provider of security, it is also a protector of civil liberty.275 Where 
the nation is now so fully consumed by prevention of catastrophic terror 
attacks and susceptible to cognitive errors, it is incumbent on judges in a 
perpetual crisis not to presume imminence but to test the government’s 
risk assessments. 
Second, proponents argue that deference is justified in the national 
security arena because of foreign and international relations, which are 
highly sensitive and demand discretion from the executive branch. 
Roberts invoked this rationale in Humanitarian Law Project, deferring 
to the government’s contention that teaching peaceful advocacy to the 
PKK could upset relations with Turkey.276 
If Humanitarian Law Project has a limiting principle, it would 
appear to be its national security and foreign affairs context. Critical to 
the decision was that it concerned material support of a foreign terrorist 
organization.277 Although not situated in the “wartime” context of 
several of the Court’s post-9/11 decisions,278 the rationale for deference 
hinges on similar reasoning. Thus, one might expect that decisions 
addressing similar communication or teaching of human rights law to a 
domestic terrorist organization would come out differently.279 
But there is good reason to question the extent of this limitation. 
The increasingly globalized and interconnected world raises questions 
about the elasticity and malleability of this theory of deference in the 
terrorism context. The most domestic of threats may well have an 
 
States, Address at National Defense University: The Future of our Fight Against Terrorism 
(May 24, 2013) [hereinafter Remarks of President Barack Obama], available at 
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/transcript-future-fight-terrorism/story?id=19245240. 
 275 See Margulies, supra note 198, at 759–60 (discussing the Court’s “punitive turn”). 
 276 See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2726–27 (2010). 
 277 See id. at 2730 (“We . . . do not suggest that Congress could extend the same prohibition 
on material support at issue here to domestic organizations.”). 
 278 Mary Dudziak views Roberts’s move away from the rhetoric of “wartime” as a positive 
development. “In finding the case to be framed by national security concerns short of war, the 
Court paralleled the new Obama administration’s attempt to step back from the capacious idea 
of a war on terror . . . .” DUDZIAK, supra note 12, at 126. I am less sanguine about the change in 
rhetoric or contextualizing. Rather, “terrorism” functions as a heuristic not all that distinct 
from Dudziak’s understanding of the rhetoric of “wartime.” Certainly both heuristics entail risk 
assessments of uncertain but catastrophic events. And just as Dudziak shows wartime cannot be 
neatly confined to temporal periods, the terrorism heuristic may similarly evade categorizations 
of foreign or domestic, criminal justice or national security, intelligence, civilian or military, 
raising questions for how the Court might review government actions that infringe on civil 
liberties. Id. at 81. 
 279 See Al Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 686 F.3d 965, 995–1001 
(9th Cir. 2012). The Ninth Circuit held in 2012 that a multicultural affairs organization had a 
First Amendment right to convene press conferences and draft press releases in coordination 
with the domestic branch of a foreign terrorist organization. Id. The court distinguished this 
case from Humanitarian Law Project, based in part on the domestic nature of the branch. See 
id. 
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international dimension or a foreign connection.280 Thus, the logical 
stopping place of this rationale is unclear. 
Third, deference advocates argue that national security issues are of 
a highly complex and classified nature, which courts are not competent 
to handle or assess. Without full information about potential harms and 
the expertise to make risk assessments, courts are not equipped to 
determine whether the government’s infringement of a particular liberty 
is appropriate.281 
Kennedy articulated the expertise rationale in Boumediene: in 
contrast to members of the other branches, most judges do not “begin 
the day with briefings that may describe new and serious threats to our 
Nation and its people.”282 Though the dissenters in Boumediene 
criticized its employment as a rhetorical pose,283 Roberts reified the 
rationale in Humanitarian Law Project at the heart of his opinion.284 
Relatedly, deference may be rationalized because the objective in 
the terrorism context is prevention, not prosecution.285 As a result, the 
government may rely on intelligence standards as opposed to those 
utilized in the criminal context.286 Courts are not familiar with the 
intelligence area and are therefore not qualified to evaluate the evidence 
that the government may rely on.287 Finally, deference may be urged due 
to the lack of precision or quantification of likelihood of an attack.288 
 
 280 At the very least, the terrorism threat is one that is varied and dynamic, defying 
compartmentalization. See Remarks of President Barack Obama, supra note 274 (“Lethal, yet 
less capable al-Qaeda affiliates, threats to diplomatic facilities and businesses abroad, 
homegrown extremists. This is the future of terrorism.”). 
 281 See Mark Tushnet, Controlling Executive Power in the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 2673, 2679 (2005) (“Judges rarely have the background or the information that would 
allow them to make sensible judgments about whether some particular response to a threat to 
national security imposes unjustifiable restrictions on individual liberty or is an unwise 
allocation of decisionmaking power.”); see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 210; Chesney, supra 
note 21, at 1409–10. 
 282 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797 (2008). 
 283 See id. at 830 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 284 See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2728 (2010). 
 285 See id. (deferring to government interpretation of evidence in part because the material 
support statute is preventative). 
 286 See id.; Balkin, supra note 13, at 15–16. 
 287 Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2727–28. 
 288 Id. at 2728; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 171 (2004). 
Posner argues that people’s reaction or ability to “overreact” to 9/11 cannot be viewed as an 
example of probability neglect because we are unable to quantify the risk of terrorist attacks. Id. 
Posner adds that “it would be a mistake to dismiss a risk merely because it cannot be quantified 
and therefore may be small—for it may be great instead.” Id.; see also HOWARD KUNREUTHER & 
ERWANN MICHEL-KERJAN, WHARTON UNIV. OF PA. RISK MGMT. & DECISION PROCESSES CTR., 
DEALING WITH EXTREME EVENTS: NEW CHALLENGES FOR TERRORISM RISK COVERAGE IN THE 
U.S. (June 2004), available at http://www.opim.wharton.upenn.edu/risk/downloads/04-14-
HK.pdf (suggesting that the “dynamic uncertainty” of terrorism, which often includes an 
amorphous enemy and secrecy about the threats, poses challenges that are not presented by 
natural disasters, for which there is an enormous amount of information on the historical risks 
and science in the public domain, or even war, which usually entails a more readily identifiable 
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The expertise rationale ignores the fact that courts review the 
decisions of experts in a myriad of highly complex subjects.289 Judges 
also may be at a greater advantage in terms of determining the accuracy 
of information because of the adversarial process, which allows them to 
weigh contrary information that executive officials might not have 
incentive to consider.290 Article III courts have, of course, overseen 
scores of terrorism cases, both of domestic and international 
dimensions.291 As for the secretive nature of certain subjects, there are 
procedures in place that have permitted courts to have access to 
classified information.292 Finally, specialized courts have also been 
created that allow for judicial review of information with standards 
distinct from those in traditional Article III courts.293 
 
enemy and location of the warzone); Howard Kunreuther & Erwann Michel‐Kerjan, The 
Market for Terrorism Insurance: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Risk Financing Solutions 14 
(Wharton Univ. of Pa. Risk Mgmt. & Decision Processes Ctr., Working Paper No. 2008-02-01), 
available at http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/risk/library/WP2008-02-01_HK,EMK_Terrorism
Insurance.pdf. 
 289 See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 582, 589 (1993) (addressing 
causation of birth defects by prescription drugs and setting standard for admitting expert 
scientific testimony in federal trials) (“[T]he trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific 
testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”); Cook v. Rockwell Int’l 
Corp., 618 F.3d 1127, 1134 (10th Cir. 2010) (considering expert testimony on the risks of 
developing cancer from exposure to plutonium); Finestone v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 272 F. 
App’x 761, 767–68 (11th Cir. 2008) (upholding district court’s exclusion of experts’ reports and 
testimony on whether nuclear power plant caused children’s cancer and characterizing experts’ 
assumption about evidence as “leaps of faith”); Bonner v. ISP Technologies, Inc., 259 F.3d 924, 
930 (8th Cir. 2001) (upholding district court’s admission of expert testimony that exposure to 
toxic organic solvent caused brain dysfunction and personality disorders); cf. Ethyl Corp. v. 
Envtl. Prot. Agency, 541 F.2d 1, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (footnote omitted) (requiring 
EPA’s risk assessment of gasoline emissions pursuant to the Clean Air Act be rational but that 
“[w]here a statute is precautionary in nature, the evidence difficult to come by, uncertain, or 
conflicting because it is on the frontiers of scientific knowledge, the regulations designed to 
protect the public health, and the decision that of an expert administrator, we will not demand 
rigorous step-by-step proof of cause and effect”). 
 290 See Chesney, supra note 21, at 1407. 
 291 See RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, IN PURSUIT OF 
JUSTICE: PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS, 2009 UPDATE AND RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS (July 2009), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/
pdf/090723-LS-in-pursuit-justice-09-update.pdf (reviewing terrorism cases prosecuted in 
federal courts). 
 292 Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA), Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025, 2025–
31 (1980) (codified at 18 U.S.C. app. 3 (2013)) (providing procedures that protect national 
security information from disclosure). 
 293 See, e.g., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–12 
(2012) (establishing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), which secretly reviews 
government applications for surveillance or searches aimed at foreign intelligence information). 
However, the FISA framework presents a host of its own problems that do not resolve the 
question of deference or the role of biases in judges’ risk assessments and fact-finding. Most 
worrisome are that the FISC’s proceedings and opinions have generally been classified, that 
there is no advocate arguing against the government’s surveillance requests, and that the FISC 
applies minimal evidentiary standards to approve surveillance, resulting in approval of almost 
all government requests. See James G. Carr, Op-Ed., A Better Secret Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 
2013, at A21 (former FISA judge proposing appointment of independent lawyers to challenge 
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Concerning the lack of quantification, some scholars argue that 
terrorism risk analysis can be undertaken as it is in other areas, where 
threats are analyzed “as a matter of course,” such as nuclear power plant 
accidents and environmental protection.294 Moreover, private entities, 
such as insurance companies, and various private and governmental risk 
analysts commonly engage in the admittedly difficult enterprise of 
predicting terrorist attacks.295 
 
government’s application for FISA orders in novel areas); see also Charlie Savage, Nation Will 
Gain by Discussing Surveillance, Expert Tells Privacy Board, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2013, at A16 
(describing former FISA Judge James Robertson’s criticism of lack of adversarial system in 
national security surveillance judicial review); Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court Orders 
1979–2012, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CENTER, http://epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/fisa_
stats.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2014). From 1979 through 2012, the government made 33,949 
applications to the FISC to conduct electronic surveillance and physical searches for foreign 
intelligence purposes. Over these thirty-three years, the FISC disapproved only eleven requests 
for collection authority. Id. Identity-protective cognition may also explain the seeming rubber 
stamp approval of FISA applications. See Kahan, supra note 76, at 20; see also Robertson, supra 
note 79, at 271–79.  Critics of the FISA court system have complained that the overwhelming 
majority of court members are biased in favor of the government based on their political 
affiliation (Republican) and employment history (executive branch lawyers). See Charlie 
Savage, Roberts’s Picks Reshaping Secret Surveillance Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2013, at A1. 
These features of the FISA courts—most notably the secrecy, lack of adversarial viewpoint, and 
reduced evidentiary standards—together with the pressure to approve national security-related 
decisions quickly and often without written opinions, make judges highly susceptible to the 
cognitive errors discussed in Part I of this article, as documented in studies of trial court judges. 
See Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 85, at 14–19, 35–40. Targeted killings have also 
engendered discussion of the creation of specialized courts for their review and approval. See, 
e.g., A Court for Targeted Killings, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2013, at A26 (calling for a special court 
as analogue to FISC); see also Remarks of President Barack Obama, supra note 274 (“[T]he 
establishment of a special court to evaluate and authorize lethal action has the benefit of 
bringing a third branch of government into the process but raises serious constitutional issues 
about presidential and judicial authority.”). But critics have warned that because ex ante 
judicial review of targeted killings implies a lack of imminence, “the establishment of a 
specialized court would more likely institutionalize the existing program, with its elision of the 
imminence requirement, than narrow it.” Jameel Jaffer, Judicial Review of Targeted Killings, 126 
HARV. L. REV. F. 185, 186 (2013) (favoring ex post judicial review through Bivens actions in 
regular federal courts). 
 294 See MUELLER & STEWART, supra note 5, at 23; see also Philip E. Tetlock & Barbara A. 
Mellers, Intelligent Management of Intelligence Agencies: Beyond Accountability Ping-Pong, 66 
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 542, 548–49 (2011) (calling for institutionalization of accuracy metrics in 
the intelligence community). The resistance to quantify probability may also be attributed to 
the refusal to tolerate any risk of terrorist attack. See Margulies, supra note 198, at 770 
(describing the driver of policy as the “explosive, populist insistence that all risk be eliminated 
and all danger prevented”); Stephen M. Walt, ‘They’re Baaack . . . ’: The Rebirth of al Qaeda?, 
FOREIGN POL’Y (July 29, 2013), http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/07/29/theyre_
baaackthe_rebirth_of_al_qaeda (calling for “a fundamental rethinking of the entire anti-
terrorism campaign” and “a rational ranking of costs, benefits, and threats”). 
 295 MUELLER & STEWART, supra note 5, at 24; see RICHARD G. LUGAR, THE LUGAR SURVEY 
ON PROLIFERATION THREATS AND RESPONSES (June 2005), available at 
https://www.fas.org/irp/threat/lugar_survey.pdf (surveying nuclear non-proliferation and 
national security experts on a variety of threats, including the likelihood of a major biological 
terrorist attack causing numerous fatalities within the next five years, which forty-three out of 
eighty-three experts characterized to be between 10% and 30%). 
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Deference can finally be rejected because experts are not always 
right.296 Indeed, experts are often political actors whose predictions and 
assessments may be both a product of fear of blame and accountability 
and objective analysis.297 Moreover, judicial review that entails an 
honest discussion of risk assessments can play an important role in a 
democratic society; how we deal with the risks we face should not be left 
only to the experts.298 
V.     REVISING JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE POST-9/11 WORLD 
This Part proposes a way forward in which judicial review is less 
deferential to the political branches and less subject to the various 
cognitive errors that generally pervade risk assessments. Building on 
Cass Sunstein’s framework for judicial analysis, which attempts to 
counteract the Precautionary Principle’s adverse effects, this Part 
proposes refinements to that framework. In particular, I propose that 
courts should apply burdens of proof and presumptions regarding 
evidence that favor the persons or groups whose civil liberties are 
curtailed. Second, courts should insist on specific evidence that supports 
deprivations of liberty, particularly those aimed at minority groups. In 
light of courts’ tendencies to defer to government interpretations of 
evidence and dilute evidentiary requirements, imposing set standards 
may counter these propensities. Drawing from literature on the 
regulation of judicial emotions, I propose that courts adopt candid 
disclosures, in the mien of Judges Lipez and Silberman, regarding the 
impact of the post-9/11 heuristic on their decision making. These 
admissions are more likely to earn trust for the courts in the public 
discourse of terrorism in a post-9/11 world. 
A.     Adjusting Sunstein’s Framework 
Sunstein accepts both that courts lack information and expertise to 
gauge whether curtailing civil liberties may be justified and that the 
probability of an attack may defy estimation.299 Notwithstanding these 
 
 296 See, e.g., PHILIP E. TETLOCK, EXPERT POLITICAL JUDGMENT: HOW GOOD IS IT? HOW CAN 
WE KNOW? (2005) (detailing errors by experts); Robert Jervis, Reports, Politics, and Intelligence 
Failures: The Case of Iraq, 29 J. STRATEGIC STUD. 3, 45–46 (2006) (observing that intelligence 
community “lacked the time as well as incentives to step back, re-examine central assumptions, 
explore alternatives, and be more self-conscious about how it was drawing its conclusions”); 
Tetlock & Mellers, supra note 294, at 542 (describing the poor prediction record of the 
intelligence community). 
 297 See McGraw, Todorov & Kunreuther, supra note 270, at 29. 
 298 See Kahan, Slovic, Braman & Gastil, supra note 75, at 1105–06. 
 299 SUNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 205. 
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limitations, Sunstein proposes a framework for judges to review 
government counterterrorism measures. Specifically, courts should (1) 
require restrictions on civil liberties to be authorized by the 
legislature;300 (2) exact special scrutiny to measures that restrict the 
liberty of members of identifiable minority groups because the ordinary 
political safeguards are unreliable when the burdens imposed by law are 
not widely shared;301 and (3) apply second-order balancing because 
case-by-case ad hoc balancing is more likely to permit excessive 
intrusions.302 
How might Humanitarian Law Project have fared in Sunstein’s 
framework? Congress’s passage of the material support law suggests that 
a court should defer under the first prong. However, the ambiguity as to 
whether the teaching of peaceful advocacy constitutes “training” or 
“expert advice or assistance” under the material support ban would 
warrant careful judicial review. Under the second prong, because the 
ban targets political speech, this speech would also deserve special 
scrutiny. Roberts may have come fairly close to applying the scrutiny 
envisioned by Sunstein by applying a level of scrutiny somewhere 
between strict scrutiny and that which is reserved for conduct.303 And 
yet, Roberts’s deference to the government’s evidence overrode even 
that high level of scrutiny.304 
Finally, what second order balancing applies? Sunstein identifies 
the considerations of imminence and likelihood from Brandenburg as 
factors that a court might consider.305 It was precisely these elements 
that Breyer asked to be considered in his dissent.306 
But would the second order balancing have made a difference to 
Roberts? The answer is almost certainly no. It is this fact that illustrates 
the limitations of Sunstein’s proposal. Just as the gravity of the harm 
may be exaggerated, the probability and imminence of that harm also 
may be overstated. Much of this may be attributed to cultural 
cognition—Roberts’s understanding that we now live in a “different 
 
 300 Id. at 211–14. 
 301 Id. at 214–17. 
 302 Id. at 217–22. 
 303 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2724 (2010). 
 304 See Solove, supra note 269, at 955 (“In deference cases, the very minimal examination of 
factual and empirical evidence tends to override whatever level of scrutiny is applied, and is 
often dispositive.”); see also Chesney, supra note 21, at 1389 n.102. Peter Margulies criticizes 
Humanitarian Law Project’s deference to the government as “both unnecessary to the decision 
and inconsistent with the heightened scrutiny that the Court adopts.” Peter Margulies, Advising 
Terrorism: Material Support, Safe Harbors, and Freedom of Speech, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 455, 496 
(2012). 
 305 SUNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 221. 
 306 Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2739 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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world.”307 As a result, Roberts, like many other judges, appeared to 
presume the probability and imminence of an attack.308 
Sunstein’s second example—torture—similarly illustrates the 
inevitably subjective calculations and related fact-finding that also 
pervade second-order balancing. Theorizing that torture might be 
justified in a specific instance under ad hoc balancing, Sunstein 
contends that utilitarian arguments of the potential for widespread and 
unjustified torture would lead courts to reject its isolated use. However, 
it is not clear that these utilitarian considerations would make a judge 
any more likely to strike down the use of torture. Based on various 
biases and cultural affinities, courts could come to different conclusions; 
and even if this second order balancing is adopted, the potential number 
of lives saved by torture could offset significant numbers of people 
wrongly tortured. Judge Silberman adverted to this in his acceptance of 
the idea of letting a potentially guilty man go free in a criminal context 
based upon second-order considerations, as well as in his refusal to 
authorize the release of a possible Al Qaeda detainee because of the 
“infinitely greater downside risk to our country.”309 
As a result, specific standards of evidence that the government 
must satisfy in order to justify infringements of civil liberties should be 
grafted onto Sunstein’s framework. These standards should favor the 
individuals or groups whose liberties may be infringed because the 
government is likely to pursue measures that not only disregard 
probability, but are also calculated to curry popular favor.310 
Researchers found, in a series of studies, that judgments of 
blameworthiness for failing to prevent an attack are far more likely to 
affect anti-terror budget priorities than probability judgments.311 The 
authors of these studies concluded that because people blame policy 
makers more for high consequence events than for more probable 
ones,312 policy makers will be tempted to “prevent attacks that are more 
 
 307 Id. at 2729 (majority opinion). 
 308 Id. at 2728. 
 309 Esmail v. Obama, 639 F.3d 1075, 1077–78 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Silberman, J., concurring). 
 310 See Chesney, supra note 21, at 1414 (discussing “weighted accuracy” as a means of 
judicial fact-finding); see also supra notes 245–48 and accompanying text. 
 311 McGraw, Todorov & Kunreuther, supra note 270, at 29. 
 312 See id. at 27. Counterterrorism priorities are not, however, an either/or game. 
“Normative considerations suggest that it is not likelihoods per se that should matter in anti-
terror preferences or blame judgments. Rather, one should take into account likelihoods and 
outcomes together, as well as their interaction (i.e., weighting outcomes by likelihoods).” Id. at 
30. Nate Silver argues that the number of fatalities should be the key concern of a 
counterterrorism strategy. NATE SILVER, THE SIGNAL AND THE NOISE: WHY SO MANY 
PREDICTIONS FAIL—BUT SOME DON’T 438 (2012) (“When it comes to terrorism, we need to 
think big, about the probability for very large magnitude events and how we might reduce it, 
even at the margin. Signals that point toward such large attacks should therefore receive a much 
higher strategic priority.”); see also id. at 441–42 (praising Israeli counterterrorism approach, 
which “tolerates small-scale terrorism” and focuses on preventing “large-scale terrorism”). But 
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severe and more upsetting without sufficiently balancing the attack’s 
likelihood against its outcome.”313 To counteract this emotional 
tendency, these authors suggested that policy makers explicitly consider 
likelihood data in formulating counterterrorism policy.314 
Similarly, without prescribed evidentiary standards, courts are 
likely to craft opinions that defer to the government’s interpretation of 
evidence and ignore probability and imminence, often by diluting the 
evidentiary requirements to the point where they favor the government. 
Indeed, Roberts decried the dissent’s call in Humanitarian Law Project 
“demanding hard proof—with ‘detail,’ ‘specific facts,’ and ‘specific 
evidence,’—that [the] proposed activities will support terrorist 
attacks.”315 Rather, it was sufficient to rely on the Blood and Belief-
sourced notion that “[a] foreign terrorist organization introduced to the 
structures of the international legal system might use the information to 
threaten, manipulate, and disrupt.”316 And Roberts was content to rely 
simply on the idea that “[t]his possibility is real, not remote.”317 But 
failing to require any demonstrable risk when the First Amendment and 
national security conflict, invites imaginings of the possible and 
plausible, without sufficient regard for the probable. Applying such a 
rule, Breyer argued, will grant the government a victory in every 
instance.318 
Breyer’s and Roberts’s dispute over the quantum of evidence 
required to establish a connection between the human rights advocates’ 
speech and terrorist attacks reverberates in the lower courts. This has 
played out most fully in the post-Boumediene litigation in the D.C. 
Circuit and district courts. In most instances, the D.C. Circuit has 
crafted evidentiary standards that benefit the government.319 
For example, the D.C. Circuit has held that the government need 
only show by a preponderance of the evidence that a detainee is a 
member of Al Qaeda or an associated force.320 Yet, many of the judges 
have chafed at the higher preponderance standard, advocating a lesser 
burden of proof.321 Furthermore, at least one D.C. Circuit member has 
 
see MUELLER & STEWART, supra note 5, at 13–23 (discussing different strategies to prevent 
terrorism). 
 313 McGraw, Todorov & Kunreuther, supra note 270, at 32. 
 314 Id. 
 315 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2727–28 (2010). 
 316 Id. at 2729 (emphasis added). 
 317 Id. Breyer countered that “the risk that those who are taught will put otherwise innocent 
speech or knowledge to bad use is omnipresent, at least where that risk rests on little more than 
(even informed) speculation.” Id. at 2738 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 318 Id. 
 319 See infra notes 320–24 and accompanying text.  
 320 See Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 321 See Esmail v. Obama, 639 F.3d 1075, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Silberman, J., concurring) 
(advocating “some evidence” standard); see also Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1104–05. The Al-Adahi 
court expressed doubt that the Suspension Clause required as high a standard of proof as that 
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contended that the courts’ opinions merely invoke the “preponderance 
of the evidence standard while in fact requiring nothing more than 
substantial evidence to deny habeas petitions.”322 Not content with the 
reduced burden of proof, the D.C. Circuit has also held that government 
intelligence reports enjoy a presumption of regularity.323 The D.C. 
Circuit has also insisted that courts undertake “conditional probability 
analysis,” or a “mosaic approach,” which entails reviewing evidence 
collectively, as opposed to in isolation.324 
The practical effect of these decisions has been to, in the words of 
D.C. Circuit Judge David Tatel, “mov[e] the goal posts” and “call[] the 
game in the government’s favor.”325 Humanitarian Law Project and the 
 
of preponderance of the evidence to show that a detainee was part of Al Qaeda, the Taliban, or 
associated forces, and thus could be detained. Id. at 1105. The government accepted the 
preponderance of the evidence standard, but has maintained that “‘a different and more 
deferential standard may be appropriate in other cases or contexts.’” Id. at 1104 (citation 
omitted). 
 322 Hussain v. Obama, 718 F.3d 964, 971 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Edwards, J., concurring) (quoting 
Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 
622 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 323 See Latif v. Obama, 677 F.3d 1175, 1178–79, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[I]ntelligence reports 
involve two distinct actors—the non-government source and the government official who 
summarizes (or transcribes) the source’s statement. The presumption of regularity pertains 
only to the second: it presumes the government official accurately identified the source and 
accurately summarized his statement, but it implies nothing about the truth of the underlying 
non-government source’s statement.”). 
 324 Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1105–07 (explaining conditional probability’s “key consideration” 
as “‘the occurrence of one [event] makes the occurrence of the other more or less likely . . . .’” 
(alteration in original) (quoting JOHN ALLEN PAULOS, BEYOND NUMERACY: RUMINATIONS OF A 
NUMBERS MAN 189 (1991))); see also Latif, 677 F.3d at 1194 (“The district court’s unduly 
atomized approach is illustrated by its isolated treatment (or failure to consider) several 
potentially incriminating inferences that arise from evidence . . . .”); Salahi v. Obama, 625 F.3d 
745, 753 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“Merely because a particular piece of evidence is insufficient, 
standing alone, to prove a particular point does not mean that the evidence ‘may be tossed aside 
and the next [piece of evidence] may be evaluated as if the first did not exist.’ The evidence 
must be considered in its entirety in determining whether the government has satisfied its 
burden of proof.” (alteration in original) (quoting Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1105)). The D.C. 
Circuit has also characterized its approach to evidence as simply drawing a “common-sense 
inference” in line with “the infamous duck test.” Hussain, 718 F.3d at 968 (“WHEREAS it looks 
like a duck, and WHEREAS it walks like a duck, and WHEREAS it quacks like a duck, WE 
THEREFORE HOLD that it is a duck.” (quoting Dole v. Williams Enters., Inc., 876 F.2d 186, 
188 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Judge Edwards criticized the 
Hussain majority’s approach as “quite invidious because, arguably, any young, Muslim man 
traveling or temporarily residing in areas in which terrorists are known to operate would pass 
the ‘duck test.’” Id. at 972 (Edwards, J., concurring). As Judge Edward’s critique suggests, the 
common sense inferences that are inherent to the duck test increase the likelihood that 
decisions will be made based on biases and intuitive reasoning rather than clear evidence. 
 325 Latif v. Obama, 666 F.3d 746, 779 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Tatel, J., dissenting); see also 
BENJAMIN WITTES, ROBERT M. CHESNEY & LARKIN REYNOLDS, THE HARVARD LAW SCH. NAT’L 
SEC. RESEARCH COMM., THE EMERGING LAW OF DETENTION 2.0: THE GUANTÁNAMO HABEAS 
CASES AS LAWMAKING 23 (2012) (observing a presumption of regularity may have the practical 
effect of placing the burden of proof on the detainee). The elevation of the “mosaic approach” 
in the habeas cases also favors the government, further diluting the evidentiary requirements. 
See id. at 112. 
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post-Boumediene litigation demonstrate that in the absence of clearly 
prescribed evidentiary standards, courts will craft a set of standards that 
support the government’s contentions, fearful of both the potential for 
harm and the public’s ire.326 
Thus, my proposal requires that burdens of proof be placed 
squarely on the government and that presumptions about evidence 
should not tilt against the person or group whose liberty interest has 
been implicated. This proposal does not ignore valid security interests 
or call the game in favor of civil liberties. What it does recognize, 
however, is that the government—and judges—often overstate the 
harm, the probability, and the imminence of terrorist threats. 
In order to justify a limitation on a liberty interest, the government 
must provide specific evidence supporting its assessments of the danger, 
probability, and imminence of a terrorist attack. Evidence must rise 
above generality and speculation.327 Courts should also adopt Cristina 
Wells’s proposed refined balancing, which entails clarifying the interests 
implicated and examining the government’s evidence supporting 
curtailment of the protected activity.328 A prescribed set of questions or 
checklist might have the salutary effect of moving judges from an 
intuitive process to a more deliberative one.329 
 
 326 Built into the Executive Branch’s evidentiary standards for targeted killings is, not 
surprisingly, a similarly government-friendly and highly malleable imminence standard. See 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 7 (determining that “clear evidence” of a 
specific or immediate attack is not needed to constitute an “imminent” threat justifying 
targeted killing). But, as a consequence, Amos Guiora warns, “identification of legitimate 
targets, the true essence of moral operational counterterrorism, becomes looser and less 
precise.” Amos N. Guiora, Targeted Killing: When Proportionality Gets All out of Proportion, 45 
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 235, 257 (2012). Guiora concludes: “In the high-stakes world of 
operational counterterrorism, there is no room for imprecision and casual definitions; the risks, 
to innocent civilians on both sides and to our fundamental values, are just too high.” Id. 
 327 In the post-9/11 world, courts have, at times, insisted upon evidence beyond that which is 
general or speculative in support of counterterrorism measures. See, e.g., John Doe, Inc. v. 
Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861, 881–83 (2d Cir. 2008) (rejecting a statutory provision requiring the 
court to treat as conclusive certification by senior governmental officials that “‘the disclosure of 
the [National Security Letter] itself or its contents may endanger the national security of the 
United States,’” and requiring “some demonstration from the Executive Branch of the need for 
secrecy” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)); Yusupov v. Att’y Gen., 518 F.3d 185, 201 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (rejecting the attorney general’s interpretation of national security exception to 
withholding of removal that would require only information that an “‘alien may pose a danger 
to the national security,’” and holding instead that that the information must show the alien 
“actually pose[s] a danger to U.S. security” (second emphasis added) (quoting In re A-H-, 23 I. 
& N. Dec. 774, 789 (A.G. 2005))); Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1312 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(holding unconstitutional the city’s use of a magnetometer at a political protest that the 
government sought to justify based on the Department of Homeland’s elevated yellow threat 
advisory level and requiring searches to be “based on evidence—rather than potentially 
effective, broad, prophylactic dragnets”). 
 328 Wells, supra note 181, at 221–22. 
 329 See KAHNEMAN, supra note 22, at 227 (discussing the value of the Apgar test in 
evaluating infant health); id. at 417–18 (noting the organizational requirements of checklists 
COVER.35.4 (Do Not Delete) 4/10/2014  2:24 PM 
1464 C ARD O Z O  L A W R E V IE W  [Vol. 35:1415 
 
Moreover, requiring such specificity is consistent with Philip 
Tetlock’s admonition that “we as a society would be better off if 
participants in policy debates stated their beliefs in testable forms.”330 
This approach can obtain greater accuracy and accountability of all 
participants, including the government, experts, and judges.331 
Finally, requiring the government to meet a substantial burden of 
proof should not be alarming. It is hard to understand, for example, 
how a “clear and convincing” burden of proof in the detention context 
would prize civil liberty too dearly. This is not an unbearable burden for 
the government. As Baher Azmy argues, courts have applied this 
standard in a variety of sensitive and complex contexts including the 
pretrial detention of people for dangerousness, the “civil commitment of 
‘sexually violent predators,’” and the commitment of those “found not 
guilty by reason of insanity.”332 A lesser standard is more likely to feed 
biases: neglecting probability and presuming imminence. 
B.     Full Disclosure 
Requiring “concrete evidence” to support government curtailments 
of civil liberties will not eradicate biases in fact-finding gleaned through 
a post-9/11 heuristic. Biases will inevitably influence the conclusions 
that judges reach about particular risks and the need for consequent 
security measures and curtailments of civil liberties. Full objectivity and 
neutrality may be an illusion—one that courts should not claim to offer 
in their opinions. Thus, courts must be circumspect in that which they 
present as fact and in how they present facts. And courts should 
acknowledge the contested terrain of risk assessment. 
Many courts have—even when deferring to the government—
made findings of fact that are not in the record. Courts should resist this 
inclination in assessing the risks of terrorism. Examples of the 
availability heuristic demonstrate that the information a court locates 
outside of the record to support assessments of danger, imminence, and 
likelihood is highly suspect.333 However, courts should also refrain from 
seeking out their own information that would suggest lesser risks; such 
 
limit errors); Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 85, at 40–42 (describing scripts, 
checklists, and multifactor tests as mechanisms for reducing judicial cognitive errors). 
 330 TETLOCK, supra note 296, at 230. 
 331 See Tetlock & Mellers, supra note 294, at 549–50. 
 332 Baher Azmy, Executive Detention, Boumediene, and the New Common Law of Habeas, 95 
IOWA L. REV. 445, 521 (2010) (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997)). 
 333 In contrast, Peter Margulies has argued that the failure of Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010), was that it did not rely on enough authority independent of the 
government’s arguments and claims. Margulies, supra note 304, at 496–97. Margulies contends 
that the citation of such sources would have lent legitimacy to the decision. Id. 
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optimistic determinations would be yet another form of probability 
neglect.334 
In addition to limiting what should be relied on as findings of fact, 
courts should take care in how they present their risk assessments. 
These findings of fact are inevitably, in part, policy judgments, and 
byproducts of emotions and cultural affinities. Kahan notes critically 
that invoking empirical evidence (or lack thereof) as the basis for 
decision is a particular feature of the Supreme Court’s constitutional 
jurisprudence.335 The use of empirical evidence also distinguishes 
courts’ post-9/11 terrorism decisions. But rather than elicit a perception 
of objectivity, this approach more often garners criticisms of bad faith 
and partisanship.336 
Courts should, therefore, openly address the emotional element 
underlying their risk assessments that may animate their decisions and 
fact-findings.337 Terry Maroney contends this sort of transparency 
ensures that emotions are expressed thoughtfully and deliberately, 
potentially limiting the initial intuitive System 1 reaction.338 Moreover, 
“judicial emotion disclosure” allows the public to both apprehend and 
consider “the legitimacy and value of those emotions.”339 
Kahan suggests that the antidote to opinions written with 
overstated certainty is to employ “judicial idioms of aporia.”340 
Practically, this means that judges should acknowledge the complexity 
of the question before them in their decisions. A less unequivocal stance 
will ideally make decisions more palatable to those who oppose the 
outcome or at least reduce the likelihood that the decisions will be 
received with great hostility and distrust.341 
Kahan also recommends that courts engage in affirmation, a 
process that offers an identity-affirming message to a particular group 
even while potentially delivering a bad outcome on the primary issue. It 
might also be characterized as “splitting the difference,” or making all 
sides happy, or unhappy, as the case may be. I am not optimistic about 
this approach to judicial expression in the post-9/11 context. In trying to 
mollify any segment of the public or the government, a court can write 
an opinion awash in rhetoric that promises all things to everyone, but 
ultimately delivers little. 
 
 334 SUNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 52–53. 
 335 Kahan, supra note 76, at 34. 
 336 Id. (citing Suzanne B. Goldberg, Constitutional Tipping Points: Civil Rights, Social 
Change, and Fact-Based Adjudication, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1996 (2006)). 
 337 See Maroney, supra note 89, at 1513–14. 
 338 Id. at 1529; Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 85, at 35–36. 
 339 Maroney, supra note 89, at 1529. 
 340 Kahan, supra note 76, at 62 (emphasis added). 
 341 Id. at 63. 
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Consider Boumediene. Kennedy’s holding that the Suspension 
Clause reached Guantanamo and that Congress had not provided an 
adequate habeas substitute was a monumental and controversial 
decision.342 In his opinion, Kennedy tried to please both sides. On the 
one hand, Kennedy noted the significant and enduring threat of 
terrorism.343 And he acknowledged a deficit of expertise and knowledge 
about the risk of terrorism.344 But on the other hand, Kennedy engaged 
in fact-finding that led to his certain conclusion that judicial 
involvement would not interfere with the military effort to deter 
terrorism.345 
Perhaps trying to win over other members of the Court or allay the 
public’s fears, Kennedy indicated that the scope of the habeas right 
could be limited.346 He stated that “[i]n considering both the procedural 
and substantive standards used to impose detention to prevent acts of 
terrorism, proper deference must be accorded to the political 
branches.”347 And he stressed that his “opinion [did] not address the 
content of the law that governs [the] detention.”348 
Any limitations to habeas and paeans to the political branches’ 
expertise did little to mollify the dissenters, instead leading Scalia and 
Roberts to accuse Kennedy of “faux deference”349 and second-guessing 
the political branches’ judgments on the adverse effect of habeas 
jurisdiction on the military mission.350 It also led, in part, to Scalia’s 
 
 342 A review of different newspaper and magazine editorial headlines reflects the disparity of 
the public response to the opinion. See Guantanamo: Rule of Law Wins, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, June 13, 2008, at B6; No King George: U.S. Supreme Court Preserves Freedom by 
Backing the Constitution’s Ban on Arbitrary Imprisonment, HOUS. CHRON., June 14, 2008, at B6. 
Contra Matthew Continetti, The Gitmo Nightmare: What the Supreme Court Has Wrought, 
WKLY. STANDARD, June 23, 2008, at 9; President Kennedy, WALL ST. J., June 13, 2008, at A14.  
 343 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 793 (2008) (“The real risks, the real threats, of 
terrorist attacks are constant and not likely soon to abate.”); id. at 795 (“[I]t does not follow that 
a habeas corpus court may disregard the dangers the detention in these cases was intended to 
prevent.”). 
 344 See id. at 797. 
 345 See id. at 769, 794–95. 
 346 Id. at 779 (“[R]elease need not be the exclusive remedy and is not the appropriate one in 
every case in which the writ is granted.”); id. at 793–94 (explaining there might not be a right to 
immediate habeas in the case of detentions of foreign citizens abroad, or “[d]omestic 
exigencies”); id. at 795–96 (approving of channeling all habeas challenges to one district to ease 
administrative burdens on the government and for the district court to use its discretion in 
accommodating the government’s interests in protecting sources and methods and intelligence 
gathering). 
 347 Id. at 796. 
 348 Id. at 798. 
 349 Id. at 830 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 350 Id. at 831. Chief Justice Roberts wrote that the majority opinion’s “modest practical 
results” suggested that the decision was more about asserting judicial supremacy over foreign 
policy and national security decisions, rather than the rights of the detainees. Id. at 801 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting). He forecasted that: 
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vivid, fact-based description of America’s “war with radical Islamists.”351 
The very lack of clarity concerning the habeas right, however, permitted 
the D.C. Circuit to severely restrict protections for detainees. This 
prompted Judge Tatel to object that that “it is hard to see what is left of 
the Supreme Court’s command in Boumediene that habeas review be 
‘meaningful.’”352 Affirmation clearly has its limits. 
Moreover, the Court’s subsequent silence in response to every 
petition for certiorari challenging the D.C. Circuit’s decisions,353 
suggests that Kennedy, and perhaps other members of the Boumediene 
majority, have come to regret the decision. It might be inferred from the 
Court’s reticence that at least some of the Justices now question the 
findings of fact that judicial involvement will not harm the country’s 
security interests.354 In splitting the difference—holding the detainees 
had a constitutional right to habeas, but allowing the D.C. Circuit to 
decide the content of the law—the Court has issued what is effectively a 
dead letter.355 The result is that the detainees’ judicial review slants 
entirely in the government’s favor. Moreover, Boumediene appears 
disingenuous, and the Court’s authority “to say what the law is”356 in the 
post-9/11 world emerges impotent.357 
The error of Boumediene was that Kennedy was not sufficiently 
candid. He sought to craft an opinion that would be all things to all 
people, which said, “detainees may enjoy a right to habeas and no one’s 
security will suffer.” Similarly, in Humanitarian Law Project, Roberts 
failed to afford what was clearly political speech the commensurate strict 
 
the habeas process the Court mandates will most likely end up looking a lot like the 
[Detainee Treatment Act] system it replaces, as the district court judges shaping it 
will have to reconcile review of the prisoners’ detention with the undoubted need to 
protect the American people from the terrorist threat—precisely the challenge 
Congress undertook in drafting the DTA.  
Id. at 802. He further predicted the opinion would only result in protracted litigation over the 
content of the habeas right before the district court and the D.C. Circuit. Id. at 826. On this 
latter score, he appears to have been clairvoyant. 
 351 Id. at 827–28 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 352 Latif v. Obama, 666 F.3d 746, 779 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Tatel, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 783). 
 353 See Al Alwi v. Obama, 132 S. Ct. 2739 (2012) (mem.); Al Kandari v. United States, 132 S. 
Ct. 2741 (2012) (mem.); Al-Madhwani v. Obama, 132 S. Ct. 2739 (2012) (mem.); Almerfedi v. 
Obama, 132 S. Ct. 2739 (2012) (mem.); Latif v. Obama, 132 S. Ct. 2741 (2012) (mem.); Uthman 
v. Obama, 132 S. Ct. 2739 (2012) (mem.); Al-Bihani v. Obama, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011) (mem.); 
see Esmail v. Obama, 639 F.3d 1075, 1078 (Silberman, J., concurring) (criticizing the Court for 
failing to “tak[e] a case [which] might obligate it to assume direct responsibility for the 
consequences of Boumediene”). 
 354 Cf. Latif, 666 F.3d at 764 (“Boumediene’s airy suppositions have caused great difficulty 
for the Executive and the courts.”). 
 355 See Esmail, 639 F.3d at 1078 (Silberman, J., concurring) (describing Boumediene as a 
“theoretical . . . assertion of judicial supremacy”). 
 356 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 357 I am indebted to Greg Gilchrist for this observation. 
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scrutiny,358 and he overstated the imminence of a terrorist attack by 
imagining how international humanitarian law could be used for 
terrorist purposes.359 Judge Edwards criticized the D.C. Circuit for 
similarly failing to acknowledge its conflation of the preponderance of 
the evidence and substantial evidence standards: “[I]t is important to at 
least acknowledge what is happening in our jurisprudence.”360 
Courts should be prepared to acknowledge the complexity of the 
situation. They should identify the role that fear and its concomitant 
biases may play in their decisions, their reasoning, and their assessments 
of evidence. A court also should be willing to acknowledge that it may 
be impossible to eliminate the risk of terrorism entirely and that a 
counterterrorism approach that limits civil liberties cannot be justified 
on such grounds.361 Indeed the Supreme Court of Israel came close to 
this sort of admission when it held that the country’s General Security 
Service could not authorize brutal interrogations.362 Chief Justice 
Aharon Barak acknowledged the potentially harmful consequences in 
his opinion by stating that the possibility “that this decision will hamper 
the ability to properly deal with terrorists and terrorism, disturbs us.”363 
As a branch of the government addressing some of the most 
consequential and contentious issues that face the nation, courts would 
do well to issue opinions that do not aggravate group polarization and 
undermine the public’s trust.364 Rather than engage in heated rhetoric or 
couch their findings as objective truth or empirical facts, judges should 
reveal their own doubts and difficulties contained within their analysis. 
Their candor may facilitate a civic dialogue over the risk we will or will 
not tolerate in regard to terrorism threats. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have attempted to explain how perceptions of risk, 
influenced by psychological, social, and cultural biases, affect judges’ 
 
 358 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2723–24 (2010); cf. id. at 2734 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[W]here, as here, a statute applies criminal penalties and at least 
arguably does so on the basis of content-based distinctions, I should think we would scrutinize 
the statute and justifications ‘strictly’ . . . .”). 
 359 Id. at 2728–29 (majority opinion). 
 360 Hussain v. Obama, 718 F.3d 964, 972 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Edwards, J., concurring). 
 361 Cf. Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 645, 650 (1980) 
(“[C]ongress’ express recognition of the futility of trying to make all workplaces totally risk-
free.”). 
 362 See Supreme Court of Israel: Judgment Concerning the Legality of the General Security 
Service’s Interrogation Methods, 38 I.L.M. 1471 (1999). 
 363 Id. at 1488. 
 364 Kahan, supra note 76, at 74. 
COVER.35.4 (Do Not Delete) 4/10/2014  2:24 PM 
2014] P RE S U ME D  I MM IN E N C E  1469 
 
decisions about terrorism. These influences offer four insights on 
opinions that courts have written since the 9/11 attacks. 
First, judges resort to fact-finding in supporting their decisions that 
balance government policies aimed at preventing terrorism and 
intrusion on people’s civil liberties. Judges often make factual findings 
regarding terrorist threats that are not supported by evidence in the 
record. Instead, these fact-findings are based on information that is 
available to them, ignoring the probability of threats actually occurring. 
As a result, judges may derive findings that overstate the risk of a 
terrorist attack. Judges are particularly susceptible to these System 1 
reactions and conclusions because of the violent and vivid nature of the 
9/11 attacks. 
Second, judges experience difficulty overcoming these intuitive 
System 1 responses because their deliberative reasoning, or System 2 
faculty, is very much a product or captive of their cultural cognition. For 
many judges, their cultural worldview is shaped by the attacks. They 
write opinions in, and about, a “post-9/11 world.” Thus, judges engage 
(often consciously) in balancing that overstates the harm from a 
terrorist attack, its probability, and its imminence. Judges also 
consequently engineer evidentiary standards in their balancing to favor 
government counterterrorism policies. 
Third, judges tend to defer to government positions and 
interpretations of evidence not only in cases involving military, 
intelligence, or international matters, but increasingly in domestic and 
criminal cases involving terrorism or the threat of terrorism. This is 
particularly problematic because of the indefinite threat of terrorism 
and the potentially permanent skewing of traditional constitutional 
protections. 
Fourth, judges often intend for their fact-findings to provide 
empirical objectivity to their assessments of terrorist threats. 
Ironically—and inevitably—even when judges purport to defer to the 
government on the ground that they are unable to assess terrorism risks, 
they still cite facts regarding the probability of, or harm from, attacks. 
Cloaking an opinion’s risk assessment in empirical certainty 
undermines the necessary, frank public debate regarding terrorism and 
how we should balance preventative measures and civil liberties. 
In light of this understanding of post-9/11 jurisprudence, I 
recommend prescribing evidentiary standards and burdens of proof that 
favor those persons or groups whose civil liberties may be curtailed by 
government policies. This weighting is necessary to counter the biases of 
the government, experts, and judges, who all tend to overweight the 
potential harm, overstate probability, and presume imminence of 
terrorist attacks. Judges must also carefully scrutinize inferences that the 
government purports to draw from evidence, which it claims supports 
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intrusions on civil liberties. This scrutiny is particularly necessary when 
only the liberties of minority groups are targeted. Generalization or 
speculation cannot suffice. Finally, judges should fully disclose their 
uncertainty over their own risk assessments. Such candor will better 
inform the political branches and the public of how judges actually 
balance security and liberty. 
